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I. INTRODUCTION
Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial
diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the
most efficient policeman.3
In legislating the pending bankruptcy “reform,” Congress has made many of the
key decisions behind closed doors. In fact, the process has been characterized as a
congressional effort to pass a “stealth bankruptcy bill.”4 This secrecy brings into
question the democratic nature of congressional deliberation. Sadly, it also
illustrates James Madison’s observation that “[a] popular Government, without
popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a
Tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; And a people
who mean to be their own Governors must arm themselves with the power which
knowledge gives.”5
Open deliberation by legislative bodies is integral to representative democracy.6
When the Framers designed the legislative branch, open debate was envisioned as
the rule, not the exception. The Framers intended for public policy to become law
only after open debate and public hearings. The Constitution was designed to foster
the enactment of laws that are “not merely an expression of preferences driven by
passion, but . . . reasoned, deliberate decisions.”7 Thus, it is a premise of our system
of government that “public knowledge of the considerations upon which
governmental action is based is essential to the democratic process.”8 The openness
of American government has long been praised by commentators. Alexis de
Tocqueville wrote that the American system “is a conciliatory government under
which resolutions have time to ripen, being discussed with deliberation and executed
only when mature.”9

3

JUSTICE LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY 92 (Augustus M. Kelley ed., 1971)
(1914), quoted in Marjorie Cohn, Open-and-Shut: Senate Impeachment Deliberations Must be
Public, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 365, 397 (2000).
4

Stealth Bankruptcy Bill Moving Ahead: Causing Waves, CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY NEWS,
May 30, 2000.
5
Letter to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (Hunt ed.
1910); Note, Open Meeting Statutes: The Press Fights for the “Right to Know,” 75 HARV. L.
REV. 1199, 1200 (1962) [hereinafter Open Meeting Statutes].
6

Brian J. Caveney, More Sunshine in the Mountain State: The 1999 Amendments to the
West Virginia Open Governmental Proceedings Act and Open Hospital Proceedings Act, 102
W. VA. L. REV. 131, 132 (1999).
7

Bernard W. Bell, Legislative History Without Legislative Intent: The Public Justification
Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 n.130 (1999) (discussing
bicameralism and presentment requirements of the Constitution).
8

Open Meeting Statutes, supra note 5, at 1199, 1200.

9

ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, Part I, 232 (Henry Steele ed., Henry
Reeve trans., 1947), quoted in Michael B. Slade, Democracy in the Details: A Plea For
Substance Over Form In Statutory Interpretation, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 187, 189 (2000).
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Unfortunately, Congress has adopted a secretive, almost Court of Star Chamberlike approach to pushing through recent bankruptcy legislation. This secrecy is
wholly inconsistent with the process of public deliberation which the Founders
envisioned. Rather, it is consistent with a Congress which appears to view the
American people as subjects rather than citizens.
Senator Russell Feingold has criticized the lack of open conference meetings on
the bankruptcy bill as “legislating at its worst . . . .”10 Of course, it is much easier to
legislate a bill if dissent and debate are discouraged.11 Rather than openly
deliberating the merits of this legislation, Congress has instead used the cover of
secrecy to adopt, wholesale, a bill largely created by lobbyists for special interests.
This is a sharp reversal from the care which Congress formerly used to deliberate
bankruptcy issues. In the words of the dissenting members of the Subcommittee on
Commercial and Administrative Law who considered an earlier version of
bankruptcy reform,
[f]or nearly 100 years, Congress has carefully considered the bankruptcy
laws and legislated on a deliberate and bipartisan basis. In the past,
Congress has elected also to carefully preserve an insolvency system, that
provides for a fresh start for honest, hard-working debtors, protects
ongoing businesses and jobs, and balances the rights of and between
debtors and creditors.12
This more deliberative approach to public policy formation is exemplified by the
legislative process which led to the 1978 Bankruptcy Act. It is said that when
Congress addressed bankruptcy in the 1970’s, it undertook a balanced, professional,
and unpoliticized approach.13 Both Houses of Congress undertook “intensive study”
of changes to the bankruptcy laws.14 The Congress of the 1970’s evaluated and
listened to the advice of the bench, the bar, academia, and the National Bankruptcy
Review Commission.15 Hearings were “extensive[,]” involving over 100 witnesses
and 2,700 pages of testimony.16 The approach did not make use of secret conference
committees.17
Today’s efforts to reform bankruptcy commenced auspiciously with the work of
the National Bankruptcy Review Commission. This independent Commission was
10

Kent Hoover, Foes: Bankruptcy Reform “Legislating at its Worst,” BUSINESS FIRST OF
BUFFALO, May 15, 2000, at 21.
11

Slade, supra note 9, at 190.

12

146 CONG. REC. H9788, H9794 (2000) (statement of Representative Jackson-Lee).

13

Brady C. Williamson, Remarks from Views from the Bench (Sept. 15, 2000), at
http://www.abiworld.org/reform/bradytalk.html.
14

LAWRENCE P. KING ET AL., B COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, App. Pt. 4(b)-201 (15th ed.
rev’d 2001) [hereinafter B COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY].
15
B COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 14, at App. Pt. 4-203; Bankruptcy: The Next 20
Years (Report of the National Bankruptcy Commission); G COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, App.
Pt. 44-8.1 (Oct. 20, 1997).
16

B COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 14, at App. Pt. 4-202.

17

Willamson, supra note 13.
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created by Congress in 1994 to examine the bankruptcy code.18 The Commission’s
goal was to “sponsor a national dialogue on bankruptcy policy . . . .”19 Moreover, the
Commission sought to “raise the public’s awareness of the causes and consequences
of financial failure for American business and American families.”20 During 1996
and 1997 the Commission conducted 21 public hearings, heard from 600 witnesses,
and received over 2,300 submissions.21 This open process culminated in a 1300page report which contained 172 recommendations and a variety of dissenting
opinions.22 Upon its completion, the Commission’s report was delivered to the
President, Congress, and the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.23
Once Congress took up the current bankruptcy reform, Congress largely removed
the process from public view. In a sharp departure from the decades-long
congressional approach to bankruptcy legislation, “Congress stopped seeking expert
advice and instead turned to special interest lobbyists . . . .”24 Thus, Congress
utilized the cover of secrecy to boldly tailor the bankruptcy laws to serve special
interests. The result is “diametrically opposed to the approach recommended by the
[National Bankruptcy Review] Commission[.]”25 As the late Professor Lawrence P.
King observed in his final public speech, the philosophy of bankruptcy law
could be summed up as granting a new financial life to a financially
distressed debtor and providing for an equitable distribution of the
debtor’s nonexempt assets among the debtor’s unsecured creditors. At
least that was the philosophy until the advent of the 105th, 106th, and the
current 107th Congresses. It seems that today’s philosophy is to damn the
poor and struggling in order to pay the rich, who will not get paid
anyway.26

18

Id.; Tenn. Student Assistance Co. v. Hornsby (In re Hornsby), 144 F.3d 433 n.4 (1998).

19

Willamson, supra note 13.

20

Id.

21

Id.

22

Id.

23

Id.

24

Alan N. Resnick, The Impact and Influence of Professor Lawrence P. King, 75 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 341, 345 (2001). However, it was not the first time Congress gave into special
interest demands in shaping the Bankruptcy Code. See Nancy Blodgett, Bad Law? Brickbats
for Bankruptcy Code, 70 A.B.A.J. 28 (1984) (quoting Professor King as criticizing the 1984
Bankruptcy Code as “one of the sloppiest jobs Congress has ever done . . . . [t]he consumer
credit industry, shopping center owners, farmers, fishermen, unions, the securities industry,
and trial lawyers all put in their two cents. It was not a matter of public policy but of who had
the loudest voice and the greatest pull.”).
25

David Goch, Washington Report, COMMERCIAL LAW BULLETIN, Nov. / Dec. 1998, at 42-

43.
26

Lawrence P. King, Address at the American College of Bankruptcy Induction Ceremony
(2001), in Professor Larry King’s final speech: ‘Give something back. That is the rallying
cry.’, BANKRUPTCY COURT DECISIONS, WEEKLY NEWS & COMMENT, April 17, 2001, at A3;
Resnick, supra note 24, at 348.
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Consequently, “[t]he use of the term ‘bankruptcy reform’ is considered an oxymoron
to most organizations of bankruptcy professionals . . . . Virtually every group of
bankruptcy professionals, regardless of the constituency represented, opposed both
the substance of the legislation and the process . . . taken by Congress.”27 One
member of Congress has even criticized the resulting bill as “not the product of a
deliberative process, it is the off-spring of a rubber stamp bankruptcy reform [and it
is] factory–manufactured . . . .”28
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT
Proponents of the current bankruptcy bill claim that the bill has been adequately
deliberated because it has been through the Senate and House on three occasions.29
During a Senate debate, Senator Hatch stated that “the bankruptcy reform legislation
we are considering today is the same legislative language that was contained in the
conference report passed by the Senate in December . . . . [T]he language was
marked up in the Judiciary Committee . . . .”30 Furthermore, Senator Grassley stated
that since he and Senator Durbin introduced the bill two Congresses ago, the bill had
been through subcommittee, full committee, in both the House and the Senate, and
also the floor of both houses, through conference, and through passage by the House
and Senate.31 Senator Biden argued that Senate bill 420 is the same bill “by and
large, with a couple improvements that passed with 70 votes last year.”32
However, despite the fact that this bill has been through three sessions of
Congress, much of the key work on it has been both rushed and secretive. This is
true for each of the three years that Congress has entertained “Bankruptcy Reform.”
In the 105th Congress the House “hurried [the] bill through,” and the Senate also
“pressed toward hasty passage,”33 this is despite the fact that the bill engendered
substantial criticism, including a letter deploring the bill signed by eighty-two law

27

Goch, supra note 25.

28

146 Cong. Rec. H9788, H9793 (2000) (Statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee).

29

Senator Sessions stated “this bill has cleared the Senate on at least three different
occasions . . . and with large majorities.” 147 CONG. REC. S1925, S1925 (2001). As this
article goes to press, the fate of the bankruptcy bill is still uncertain. Currently the bill is
stalled in a “holding pattern” due to congressional disagreement about the bankruptcy
treatment of debts incurred by protestors at abortion clinics. (See American Bankruptcy
Institute, http://www.abiworld.org/headlines/todayshead.html; see also Philip Shenon, AntiAbortion Lobbyists Tying Up Bankruptcy Overhaul Bill, NY TIMES, Sept. 23, 2002). Although
Congress may have had more open hearings on the bankruptcy bill in 2002 than it did in the
immediately preceding years, that does not make up for the fact that the key provisions of the
bill were apparently originally inserted at the behest of special interests under the cover of
legislative secrecy.
30

147 CONG. REC. S1925, S1925 (2001).

31

147 CONG. REC. S1925, S1935 (2001).

32

147 CONG. REC. S1925, S1952 (2001).

33

Russ Feingold, Lobbyists’ Rush for Bankruptcy Reform, THE WASHINGTON POST, June 7,
1999, at A19.
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professors.34 Although both Houses appointed members to serve on a Conference
Committee, there was no real conference.35 There were no public Conference
Committee meetings.36 There were no Conference Committee meetings at all
involving members of Congress from the minority.37
Again in the 106th Congress, the official Conference Committee met in name
only.38 Instead, Congress implemented an informal “shadow” conference committee
to exclude the minority from negotiations on the bill.39 Members of Congress were
excluded from these months-long secret negotiations, yet insiders were allowed to
attend.40 The negotiations in the shadow conference were behind closed doors,41
“cloaked in secrecy.”42 In 2001 proponents of bankruptcy reform planned yet again
to push legislation through via a shadow conference.43 Traditionally, conferences are
open to the public.44 The secret meeting of members of Congress made it difficult to
obtain information about the shaping of the legislation.45 Secret committee meetings
are usually only held for military and intelligence matters.46 That it was the de facto

34
Re: The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999 (S.625), available at http://www.abiworld.org/
legis/profcrit.html. Professors criticized it as filled with “provisions that tighten the screws on
families who legitimately need debt relief,” and containing “cumbersome requirements.” Id.
35
Brady C. Williamson, Remarks at The University of Texas School of Law (Nov. 16,
2001) (draft on file with the authors). Mr. Williamson was Chairman of the National
Bankruptcy Review Commission.
36

Id.

37

Id.

38

Id.

39

Leahy Responds to Sensenbrenner Request to Begin Reconciliation, NATIONAL
JOURNAL’S CONGRESS DAILY, July 24, 2001; Donald L. Bartlett & James B. Steele, Soaked by
Congress, TIME, May 15, 2000 64 (“[n]ow members of both chambers are meeting in secret
. . . .”); Countdown to PTNR, Gas Tax Fight Livens a Pre-Recess Week, NATIONAL JOURNAL’S
CONGRESS DAILYPM, April 10, 2000 1 (discussing “behind the scenes negotiations”); Pamela
Barnett, As Deadline Nears, Bankruptcy Bill Shows Signs of Life, NATIONAL JOURNAL’S
CONGRESS DAILYPM, April 10, 2000 3 (labeling the “behind-the-scenes negotiations” as a
“non-conference[.]”).
40

Stealth bankruptcy bill moving ahead, causing waves, supra note 4.

41
Pamela Barnett, Another ‘Shadow’ Conference Expected on Bankruptcy, NATIONAL
JOURNAL’S CONGRESS DAILY, March 20, 2001. See John C. Henry, House Gives Approval to
Bankruptcy Reform, THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE, October 13, 2000, at Business p.1.
42

Stealth Bankruptcy Bill Moving Ahead, Causing Waves, supra note 4.

43

Barnett, supra note 41.

44

Ed Roberts, Last-Ditch Effort Made to Save Bankruptcy Bill, CREDIT UNION JOURNAL,
May 8, 2000, at 1.
45
Marcy Gordon, House Passes Bankruptcy Bill; Clinton Threatens Veto, THE RECORD,
October 13, 2000, at B4.
46

Allison C. Giles, The Value Of Nonlegislators’ Contributions To Legislative History, 79
GEO. L.J. 359 n.134 (1990).
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conference committee that met in secret is particularly troubling, for conference
committees are especially powerful.
III. THE SPECIAL POWER OF CONFERENCE COMMITTEES
Most congressional work is done in committee.47 Conference committees are
typically used by Congress to iron out the discrepancies between the different House
and Senate versions of a bill.48 Conference committees are typically used for
complex legislation.49 A conference committee is effectively comprised of two
committees, one from each house.50 Each committee votes separately by majority
vote.51 Conference committees can last anywhere from hours to months, and there is
no set requirement for the number of representatives and senators on a conference
committee. In recent years they have ranged in size from six to two hundred
members.52 Conference committees have no set pattern.53 No rules apply.54 Often
neither transcripts nor summaries are provided to the public.55 The only explanation
the public often gets to see of the mysterious workings of a secret conference
committee is the conference report and its accompanying documents, which are often
“murky.”56 When a conference is complete, the House and Senate vote on the results
as a whole, in an all-or-nothing fashion.57 One commentator describes the typical
conference committee as “a shadowy arm of Congress, composed of a handful of
senior members who hold secret, late-night meetings to mull over key questions of
federal policy. No rules govern their activities, and once they’ve made their
decisions, their legislative handiwork is presented to rank-and-file lawmakers on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis.”58 In the words of one Senator, conference committees are
so powerful that they are the part of Congress “least accountable to the public, [that]

47

Open Meeting Statutes, supra note 5, at 1204; John J. Watkins, Open Meetings Under
the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act, 38 ARK. L. REV. 268, 272 (1984).
48

Richard E. Cohen, The Third House Rises, 33 NAT’L J., Vol. 33, No. 30 (2001). An
alternative to the conference committee process often used when Congress is pressed for time
is a “ping-pong” of messengers between the open House and open Senate. Id.
49

Cohen, supra note 48.

50

Charles W. Johnson, HOW OUR LAWS
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/lawsmade.toc.html.

ARE

MADE 37 (2000), available at

51

Id.

52

Cohen, supra note 48.

53

Id.

54

Id. Technically there are rules that apply, see infra notes 65, 90 and text. But in practice
the rules of procedure are frequently ignored.
55

Id.

56

Id.

57

Cohen, supra note 48; Johnson, supra note 50; Bankruptcy Bill Ready to Head to HouseSenate Conference?, 2000 ABI JNL Lexis 4, *2.
58

Cohen, supra note 48.
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. . . afford special interests many opportunities to influence legislation.”59 In short,
the conference committee is the “last bastion of secrecy in a lawmaking process that
is supposed to operate in the sunshine.”60 This secrecy is significant because
conference committees are becoming increasingly important in the legislative
process.61 Such is the power of congressional committees that they are referred to as
“the Third House of Congress,” “the Supreme Court of legislation.”62
The shadow conference on Bankruptcy reform was in contravention of the
“regular process by which the House and Senate reconcile the differences between
bills, which requires public debate on the floor, which provides the minority the right
to raise its concerns on the floor and insist on a vote, which requires a vote of the
members to go to conference, and which requires at least one open and public
meeting . . . .”63 In short, congressional leaders decided to pass the bill by ignoring
the rules of congressional procedure at the expense of a fair, open process.64 The
House rules do not provide for such a shadow conference, and neither the House nor
the Senate ever voted to go to conference as required.65
In the words of one commentator, “[u]sually . . . compromises are worked out in
a conference committee with duly appointed members from both legislative bodies
and at least the appearance of public scrutiny. But not so for the bankruptcy bill,
which . . . virtually bypass[ed] the conference process by being attached as a last
minute rider to a bill ready to leave its conference committee.”66 Congress
59

Cohen, supra note 48, citing SENATOR WELLSTONE, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL.

60

William Safire, Essay, Stop Conference Roulette, N.Y. TIMES, April 12, 2001, A29.

61

Society of Prof. Journalists v. Secretary of Labor, 616 F. Supp 569, 572 (D. Utah 1985),
citing Watkins, supra note 47, at 271.
62
Cohen, supra note 48; Johnson, supra note 50, at 37. Abuse of the conference
committee process is detrimental to our system of representative democracy. In the words of
the Parliamentarian of the U.S. House of Representatives,
[o]ne of the most practical safeguards of the American democratic way of life is this
legislative process that with its emphasis on the protection of the minority, gives
ample opportunity to all sides to be heard and make their views known. The fact that
a proposal cannot become a law without consideration and approval by both Houses of
Congress is an outstanding virtue of our bicameral legislative system.
Charles W. Johnson, Guide to Legislative Process in the House, at http://www.house.gov/
ruleslph-fore.htm (last modified Jan. 1997).
63

Rep. Jerrold Nadler, Statement by Rep. Jerrold Nadler Condemning the Bankruptcy
“Shadow Conference,” at http://www.abiworld.org/research/nadler.html (May 2, 2000).
64

Id.

65

Id. According to the Parliamentarian of the U.S. House of Representatives,
[t]he rules of the House require that one conference meeting be open, unless the
House, in open session, determines by a record vote that a meeting will be closed to
the public. When the report of the conference committee is read in the House, a point
of order may be made that the conferees failed to comply with the House rule
requiring an open conference meeting. If the point of order is sustained, the
conference report is considered rejected by the House . . . .
Johnson, supra note 50, at 37.
66

Stealth Bankruptcy Bill Moving Ahead, Causing Waves, supra note 4.
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substituted the bankruptcy bill for an unrelated State Department funding bill which
had already passed both chambers of Congress.67 This highly unusual procedural
tactic was designed to facilitate passage of the bankruptcy bill.68 This procedural
end-run allowed the Bankruptcy bill to bypass at least five opportunities for filibuster
in the Senate.69 As one former Senator states, “I thought I’d seen every trick in the
book, but attaching a secretly negotiated Bankruptcy bill to completely unrelated
legislation already in conference is unbelievable.”70
IV. CRITICISM WITHIN CONGRESS
The Senate version was shaped by a small group of Senators in what both
Senators Feingold and Feinstein referred to as a “shadow conference.”71 Senate
negotiators in the shadow conference made “significant concessions to their House
counterparts[,]” resulting in legislation “much harsher than the bill [the entire
Senate] adopted . . . .”72 Perhaps this is because “by some accounts, lobbyists for the
credit card industry . . . literally helped draft sections of the pending legislation.”73
Even congressional proponents of bankruptcy reform admit that the legislation was
largely shaped by the financial services industry.74 This is in sharp contrast to the
shaping of bankruptcy legislation in 1978. Although the 1978 Bankruptcy Code
legislation was influenced by lobbyists, they did not dominate the process.75 In the
words of Senator Feingold,
67

Henry, supra note 41.

68

Id.

69

Id.

70
Stealth Bankruptcy Bill Moving Ahead, Causing Waves, supra note 4 (statement of
retired Sen. Howard M. Metzenbaum.).
71

147 CONG. REC. S1925, S1950 (2001); 147 CONG. REC. S2343, S2375 (2001).

72

Wellstone, Feingold Urges Clinton to Veto Bankruptcy Bill, NATIONAL JOURNAL’S
CONGRESS DAILY, May 18, 2000.
73

Williamson, supra note 13. Unfortunately, lobbyists who perform the work of Congress
are not unique to bankruptcy reform. In the words of one observer, “some . . . lobbyists
actually resent members of Congress . . . interfering with what they view as their legislation
. . . . [W]e have . . . reached a point where legislative history must be ignored because not even
the hands of congressional staff have touched committee reports.” William F. Patry,
Copyright and the Legislative Process: A Personal Perspective, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 139, 140 (1996).
74
According to Rep. Gekas, “[c]redit unions have played a critical role in shaping this
bill[.]” Ed Roberts, CUNA’s Influence Seen as Bankruptcy Vote Nears, CREDIT UNION
JOURNAL, Feb. 26, 2001, at 1. Although credit unions are normally political allies of
consumer groups, the Credit Union National Association [hereinafter CUNA] elected to side
with the American Bankers Association in working to thwart the recommendations made by
the National Bankruptcy Review Commission. Id. CUNA lobbyists met secretly with
lobbyists from the American Bankers Association in “working to draft priorities for
legislation.” Id. Credit union lobbyists succeeded in inserting a special reaffirmation
exception into the bill which allows credit unions “to use a short form with fewer
disclosures[,]” thus encouraging debtors to reaffirm their debts to credit unions. Id.
75

Williamson, supra note 13.
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[A]mending the bankruptcy code used to be a nonpartisan exercise, where
the Congress listened to experts--practitioners and law professors and
judges and trustees, and made careful considered judgments about how
the law should work. Now it seems as if we ignore the experts and
instead do what the credit industry wants us to do. We use parliamentary
tactics to avoid reasoned consideration. Those tactics harm the bill, and
discredit the Senate.76
Similarly, Senator Wellstone observed:
[T]his bill was negotiated by only a small group of Members, out of the
public eye. . . . [U]ntil this year, it had never been [before the full Senate]
in an amendable fashion . . . . [U]ntil a hearing was held by the Judiciary
Committee on February 8, there had been no hearings on this legislation.
In fact, the Senate had not conducted its own hearing on bankruptcy since
1988 . . . .
So I see a compelling reason for some . . . debate on this bill. The bill
deserves scrutiny. It should be held up to the light of day so that citizens
can see what an ill-made misshapen attempt at reform this legislation is.
Colleagues in this body need to understand what bad legislation really is,
how terrible an impact a piece of legislation such has this can have on
America’s most powerless families, and what a complete giveaway this
piece of legislation is to banks, to credit card companies, and to other
lenders.77
The fact that the bill had not been before the full Senate in an amendable fashion
is significant because as Senator Feingold notes, the current Senate bill is basically
the same as the one vetoed by former President Clinton.78 There is an indication that
members of Congress intentionally inserted extreme provisions into that bill for
tactical reasons, so as to stake out a negotiating position against the President.79 The
Senate knew the bill would be vetoed.80
Most significantly, the bill suffered many adverse changes in the secret
Conference Committee. As Senator Durbin stated, the more balanced bankruptcy
bill which received substantial support on the floor of the Senate “went into the meat
grinder of the conference committee and came out loaded with provisions which . . .

76

147 CONG. REC. S1925, S1947 (2001).

77

147 CONG. REC. S1925, S1929 (2001).

78

147 CONG. REC. S1925-02, S1947 (2001).

79

According to Senator Feingold, “[i]n the past two Congresses, it has been my impression
that the Republican majority has made decisions on the substance of this bill in order to stake
out a negotiating position vis-a-vis the White House. Twice it has ignored the work done by
the Senate on the floor and come up with a conference vehicle that was designed to provoke a
veto.” 147 CONG. REC. S1925, S1946 (2001).
80

Senator Murray stated that the Senate knew the conference report would be vetoed by
the president. 146 CONG. REC. S11683, S11728 (2000).
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were unfair to consumers. . . .”81 In short, the more even-handed bill was “decimated
in conference.” The most recent iteration of this bill may still become the new
Bankruptcy Code.82
Among the provisions changed by the secret Conference Committee: the
Committee removed the cap on homestead exemptions which had previously been
approved by the senate 76-22.83 The Committee removed a provision which ensured
that judgments entered under the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act could
not be discharged in bankruptcy.84 A requirement that Internet credit card
solicitations contain advice about using credit cards was deleted.85 An amendment
which would have prevented credit card companies from charging interest
retroactively was removed.86 An amendment requiring a study to determine if credit
card companies use zip codes to determine credit worthiness was omitted.87 Senator
81

147 CONG. REC. S1925, S1938 (2001).

82
Both chambers of the 107th Congress approved respective bankruptcy bills in March of
2001. Sensenbrenner to Set Bankruptcy Conference, NATIONAL JOURNAL’S CONGRESS DAILY,
Nov. 2, 2001. There were approximately forty significant differences between the House and
Senate Versions. Bankruptcy Conferees Make Little Progress in Reconciling Bills, THE
BULLETIN’S FRONTRUNNER, Nov 15, 2001. The Conference Committee had been scheduled to
meet to reconcile these differences on September 12, 2001. Bankruptcy Conference May
Resume as Netting Bill Considered, NATIONAL JOURNAL’S CONGRESS DAILY, Oct. 30, 2001.
Proponents such as Senator Grassley hoped to avoid an open Conference once more in 2001
through procedural machinations. Barnett, supra note 41. See Supporters of Bankruptcy
Reform Remain Hopeful, NATIONAL JOURNAL’S CONGRESS DAILY, September 11, 2001.
In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, Congress indefinitely postponed the
Conference. Bankruptcy Slips From Congressional Agenda in Wake of Terrorism, at
http://www.abiworld.org/headlines/01sept17.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2001). Yet by
November 14, the Conference Committee was back at work. Partisan Rhetoric Returns with
Bankruptcy Bill, CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY NEWS, Nov. 27, 2001. The Committee is
comprised of nineteen House members and thirteen Senators. Congressional Bankruptcy
Panel Convenes, THE DAILY DEAL, Nov. 14, 2001. At least six of these members of Congress
“steadfastly oppose” the bill. Id. Detractors of the bill want the Conference Committee to reevaluate the entire bill in light of the current recession. Outlook Uncertain for Bankruptcy
Reform Effort, AUSTIN BUS. J., Nov. 23, 2001, at 10. Ironically, supporters of the bill now
want to limit the scope of the Conference Committee’s deliberations to differences between
the House and Senate versions of the bill. Id; Bankruptcy Conferees Make Little Progress in
Reconciling Bills, THE BULLETIN’S FRONTRUNNER, Nov. 15, 2001.
Proponents of altering our bankruptcy system face a political obstacle in the current
economic downturn. “Giving creditors more power to collect debt might not be good politics
at a time like this.” Outlook Uncertain for Bankruptcy Reform Effort, AUSTIN BUS. J., Nov.
23, 2001, at 10. Nonetheless, proponents considered inserting parts of the bankruptcy reform
bill in unrelated legislation. Consumer Bankruptcy after 9-11-01, CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY
NEWSM, Oct. 17, 2001. And the consumer credit industry is expected to push for bankruptcy
reform yet again in 2002. Id.
83

146 CONG. REC. S11683, S11726 (2000).

84

Id.

85

Id.

86

Id.

87

146 CONG. REC. S11683, S11728 (2000).
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Durbin’s amendment to curtail a predatory lending practice aimed at the elderly was
“adopted unanimously on a previous bill [yet] was stripped out in conference.”88
The Conference report also omitted an amendment that would have allowed
fishermen to use chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code.89
Even worse, the Committee used the cover of secrecy to improperly insert
legislation favorable to special interests. Normally the matters that conferees are
allowed to consider are “strictly limited” to matters on which the two Houses
disagree.90 Conferees are ordinarily prohibited from inserting new matter beyond the
scope of the differences between the two Houses.91 Yet with the bankruptcy bill,
Senator Feingold noted that several provisions simply “appeared out of nowhere[,]”
and were not contained in previous bills.92 Representative Watt also stated “there
were some provisions . . . that just appeared out of nowhere in the course of the
conference . . . . They just like magic appeared.”93 One example is the provision
entitled “Protection of Retirement Savings in Bankruptcy” which oxymoronically
imposes a cap upon the amount of retirement savings which debtors can keep beyond
the reach of creditors.94
Another example of “lawmaking at its worst” was the provision to assist
investors in Lloyds of London.95 Senator Feingold states that there were no hearings
on the Lloyds’ provision, it did not come out of Committee, nor did it come out of
the Senate or House.96 Instead, it was “just slipped into the bill at the last minute.”97
Additionally the cap on the homestead exemption was watered down during the
“shadow conference.”98 Virtually all these substantive changes enacted by the secret
Committee acted to benefit the credit card and banking industries. Senator Feingold
explained this phenomenon by stating that “[p]owerful economic interests see an
opportunity to push through major structural changes to the bankruptcy system
before the public becomes aware of the consequences of what they are doing and

88

147 CONG. REC. S1925, S1941 (2001).

89

146 CONG. REC. S11683, S11727 (2000).

90

Johnson, supra note 50, at 37.

91

Id. If a conference committee introduces extraneous material not committed to by either
House, the conference committee is not in order. Id. A point of order may be made to reject
such extraneous material. Id. at 38-41.
92

147 CONG. REC. S1925, S1948. (2001).

93

Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2001, Hearings Before the House
Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R. 333, 107th Cong. 1, 232 (2001) (statement of Rep. Watt),
available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju71179.000/hju71179_0f.htm
(last visited Feb 8, 2001).
94

147 CONG. REC. S1925, S1948 (2001).

95

147 CONG. REC. S1925, S1950 (2001) (statement of Sen. Feingold).

96

147 CONG. REC. S1925, S1951 (2001).

97

Id.

98

147 CONG. REC. S2324, S2334 (2001).
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works to stop them.”99 In short, it was an effort to “hijack the legislative process for
the self-interested purposes of a single industry.”100
What motivated Congress to railroad bankruptcy reform through a secret
committee? One commentator observes that, although neither the legislative process
nor members of Congress are corrupt, there is “no escaping the fact that financial
institutions . . . have made significant contributions to well-placed members of
Congress of both parties.”101 Prior to Senate votes on the bill, MBNA Corporation
contributed $250,000 to the Republican Senatorial committee, and $150,000 to the
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee.102 Such was the largesse of the
financial services industry that one congressional staff member who worked on the
legislation observed “[i]f this were NASCAR, the members would have to have the
corporate logos of their sponsors sewn to their jackets.”103
The most disturbing example is the recent revelation that in 1998, MBNA
Corporation loaned $447,500 to Representative James P. Moran Jr. just four days
before Representative Moran emerged as one of the lead sponsors of the bankruptcy
bill.104 Representative Moran stated that the timing of the loan was “wholly
coincidental”105 and that “[t]here was no connection with my sponsoring bankruptcy
[reform] and this loan . . . .”106
Yet the loan was the largest refinancing package given by MBNA to any
individual debtor that year.107 MBNA made this loan despite the fact that MBNA’s
own rating system ranked the congressman’s credit score at the bottom 14th
percentile of American consumers, with a 40% chance of default.108 Moreover,
critics allege that the terms of the loan were overly generous: the interest rate was
unusually low, and MBNA appraised the congressman’s home at too high a value.109
MBNA’s spokesman defends its loan to the congressman by stating “we thought this
was a good business deal.”110
Perhaps it was. The loan from MBNA may well have enabled the congressman
to avoid default, thus allowing him to subsequently state to his colleagues in
99

Feingold, supra note 33.

100

Id.

101

Williamson, supra note 13.

102

Roberts, supra note 44; Bartlett & Steele, supra note 39.

103

Bartlett & Steele, supra note 39.

104

Jo Becker & Spencer S. Hsu, Credit Firm Gave Moran Favorable Loan Deal;
Lawmaker Supported Finance Industry Bill, THE WASHINGTON POST, July 7, 2002 A01.
105

Philip Shenon, Bankruptcy Bill Opponents Criticize Loan, THE NEW YORK TIMES,
August 9, 2002 A11.
106

Becker & Hsu, supra note 104.

107

Shenon, supra note 105; Becker & Hsu, supra note 104.

108

Becker & Hsu, supra note 104.

109

Becker & Hsu, supra note 104.

110

Report: Moran championed lender’s cause after receiving loan, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
STATE & LOCAL WIRE, July 6, 2002 (statement of Brian Dalphon).
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Congress that “the current bankruptcy system is broken” and that “the time-honored
principle of moral responsibility and personal obligation to pay one’s debts has been
eroded by the convenience and ease with which one can discharge his or her
obligations.”111
Overall, the financial services industry showered members of Congress with
more than $23.4 million.112 In short, the lobbying efforts involved a “sophisticated
public-relations blitz” which lobbied for changes to our bankruptcy laws.113
Even sponsors of the bill are befuddled about the origin of special interest
provisions within the bill. When Representative Watt enquired as to who inserted
the special interest provision dealing with Lloyds, Representative Gekas replied “I’m
not certain . . . . But I must tell you . . . in the interest of getting the . . . reform
passed, that I acceded to this insertion.”114
Apparently while the special interest lobbyists understand this bill, Congress does
not.115 In the words of Senator Feingold, “[t]his is an immensely complicated bill
about a very technical area of the law. There are provisions in the bill that . . . no
one in the Senate really understands.”116
Senator Leahy recounted how the bill moved through the secret conference
committee:
111

Shenon, supra note 105

112
Lisa Fickenscher, Bankruptcies Down; Enthusiasm for Reform Wanes, AM. BANKER.,
Sept. 30, 1999. The lobbying campaign included the credit industry’s placement of
advertisements pushing bankruptcy reform in publications read by members of Congress such
as Roll Call and Congress Daily. Id. The financial industry also placed ads in national
newspapers and funded studies to support bankruptcy reform. Bartlett & Steele, supra note
39.
113
Bartlett & Steele, supra note 39; Common Cause, BANKRUPTCY LEGISLATION ENTERS
FINAL STAGES; CONSUMER CREDIT INDUSTRY GAVE $7.5 MILLION IN CAMPAIGN
CONTRIBUTIONS IN 1999, ACCORDING TO COMMON CAUSE 1 (2000). Common Cause also
noted that the five “shadow conferees” on bankruptcy reform received $854,789 from creditor
interests. Id. at 3-4.
114

Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2001, Hearings Before the House
Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R. 333, supra note 93, at 485 (The Lloyds provision was
ultimately taken out.).
115

Senator Feingold criticized the influence of special interests upon bankruptcy reform,
stating “[w]e have no idea what other provisions written by the credit card companies will be
sneaked onto that bill.” Hoover, supra note 10, at 21.
116

147 CONG. REC. S1925, S1950 (2001). One wonders how a court is to discern
congressional intent when much of Congress’s work on the statute was secret. When parties
ignore congressional intent in bankruptcy it undermines stability, increases costs, and leads to
interpretive disputes. Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code: An
Empirical Study of the Supreme Court’s Bankruptcy Decisions, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 173, 177-79
(2000). Interpretive disputes are particularly problematic in corporate bankruptcy. Id. When
interpretive disputes foster litigation, the litigation expenses detract from the estate’s already
limited resources. Id. The cost of increased litigation can make the difference between
reorganization and liquidation. Id. “Every dollar spent litigating is a dollar removed from an
asset base that is already inadequate to satisfy claims.” Id. at 178. In short, a statute where
Congress hides its legislative intent may be particularly problematic when the statute relates to
corporate bankruptcy.
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The Senate had requested a conference in August 1999 on legislation to
enhance security of U.S. missions . . . . That did not proceed. On October
11, 2000, the House appointed conferees not from the committee with
jurisdiction over any embassy security issues, but from the House
Judiciary Committee. Then a few hours later, out of nowhere, the
leadership filed a conference report that strikes every aspect of the
underlying legislation on which the two Houses had gone to conference
and put in this wholly unrelated matter with reference to a bankruptcy bill
that had not even passed. It had only been introduced that day. There was
no debate, nothing. It is like: Whoops, open the closet door, let the
special interests out, slam it down, and please pass it . . . . [This was] an
autocratic, behind-closed-doors, undemocratic process, and it makes a
mockery of the legislative process.117
Afterwards, the House voted 398-1 for an open Committee hearing. But two
hours after the House vote, the sham conference report was filed.118 Senator
Wellstone deplored the process:
Let me say a few words about the process on this legislation, which is
terrible. The House and Senate Republicans have taken a secretly
negotiated bankruptcy bill and stuffed it into the State Department
authorization bill in which not one provision of the original bill remains.
Of course, State Department authorization is the last of many targets. The
majority leader has talked about doing this on an appropriations bill, on a
crop insurance bill, on the electronic signatures bill, on the Violence
Against Women Act. So desperate are we to serve the big banks and
credit card companies that no bill has been safe from this controversial
baggage.
We are again making a mockery of scope of conference. We are
abdicating our right to amend legislation. We are abdicating our right to
debate legislation. And for what? Expediency. Convenience.
However, I am not sure that we have ever been so brazen in the past.
Yes we have combined unrelated, extraneous measures into conference
reports. Usually because the majority wishes to pass one bill using the
popularity of another. Putting it into a conference report makes it
privileged. Putting into a conference report makes it unamenable. So
they piggy back legislation. Fine. But this may be the first time in the
Senate’s history where the majority has hollowed out a piece of legislation
in conference--left nothing behind but the bill number--and inserted a
completely unrelated measure . . . . The game is how to move legislation
through the Senate with as little interference as possible from actual
Senators.”119
117

146 CONG. REC. S11683, S11692 (2000).

118

Id.

119

146 CONG. REC. S11683, S11687 (2000).
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V. BANKRUPT EMBASSIES?
The use of the American Embassy Security Act to railroad the bankruptcy bill
through Congress is so extraordinary and remarkable that it bears further
examination. Commenting on this unprecedented procedural ploy, Senator Leahy
inquired:
[T]his was not a case where . . . the embassies were all going bankrupt?
The embassy in London or in Moscow or, heaven forbid, in Dublin, might
be in bankruptcy court in the Southern District of New York? That is not
the case?120
Senator Wellstone replied, “I say to my colleague from Vermont that argument
has not been made. So far, that argument has not been made.”121
Senator Leahy continued,
I thank my friend from Minnesota. I appreciate his pointing this out. I
just want students who might look at this afterward and wonder what
bankruptcy has to do with embassies to go back and read what the
distinguished Senator from Minnesota says, which is, of course, that it has
absolutely nothing to do with embassies. It is a parliamentary trick to get
a piece of special interest legislation through.122
Here is how bankruptcy reform was substituted for the American Embassy
Security Act: Representative Chabot offered a motion to agree to the conference.123
Then he yielded all the time to himself.124 In effect, he would have denied the
minority time to debate the bill.125 Representatives from the minority strenuously
objected. Representative Conyers pointed out that it is traditional that the minority
receive half of the time for debate.126 An agreement was reached that the minority
would have ten minutes of time (instead of the thirty minutes it would ordinarily be
entitled to.)127 Representative Gekas indicated that not permitting the minority to
debate was acceptable because of a prior gentleman’s agreement.128 However, at
least one member of the House was not aware of any such prior agreement.129 Then,
Representative Conyers noted that “the State Department authorization has already
been enacted.” An excerpt from the exchange that followed is informative:
120

146 CONG. REC. S11683, S11692 (2000).

121

Id.

122

Id.

123

146 CONG. REC. H9788, H9788 (2000).

124

Id.

125

146 CONG. REC. H9788, H9788-89 (2000) (statements of Reps. Nadler, Conyers, and
Gejdenson).
126

146 CONG. REC. H9788, H9788 (2000).

127

Id.

128

Id.

129

146 CONG. REC. H9788, H9789 (2000).
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Mr. CONYERS. I could give the gentleman the answer as well, but the
question is, is this bill before us merely a vehicle to enact the bankruptcy
provisions?
Mr. GEKAS. No, not merely.
Mr. CONYERS. Not merely. What else?
Mr. GEKAS. It depends on what the word “else” means and what “is”
means. But at this point it is not merely to put in the bankruptcy.
Mr. CONYERS. Yes that is very good.
Mr. Speaker, this is a very poor process, as everybody on the floor has
already noted. This is totally against tradition, to attempt to move this
measure of bankruptcy into a measure that has already been passed into
law. This is incredible . . . .130
Later, Representative Nadler inquired of Representative Gekas “[w]hat on earth
does this have to do with the State Department authorization?”131 The response of
Representative Gekas merits careful reading: “it has to do with the search for better
government within the Congress of the United States, in the realm of the State
Department and in the realm of bankruptcy reform, and for the good of our people
who demand action on the State Department and on bankruptcy reform.”132 To this,
Representative Nadler replied “[i]n other words, we are using the State Department
Bill for something that has nothing to do with the State Department, because we
cannot find an honest way under the rules of the House to do this.”133
Representative Nadler attempted to get the majority to make a “gentleman’s
commitment” that the rules of the House would be observed and the conference
committee meetings would be open to the public.134 He sought a pledge from the
majority that they would carry out an open conference committee meeting.135 And
the majority’s response? Representative Gekas equivocated.136 The Chairman of the
Committee on the Judiciary apparently did not care to comment at all.137
Representative Nadler offered a motion to instruct the conferees that all
bankruptcy reform conference committee meetings “be open to the public and to the
print and electronic media;” and “be held in venues selected to maximize the

130

Id.

131

146 CONG. REC. H9788, H9790 (2000).

132

Id. Representative Boucher later stated that “procedural hurdles in the Senate”
necessitated the unprecedented State Department bill substitution. Id. at H9791.
133

146 CONG. REC. H9788, H9790 (2000).

134

146 CONG. REC. H9788, H9792 (2000).

135

146 CONG. REC. H9788, H9793 (2000).

136

146 CONG. REC. H9788, H9792 (2000).

137

146 CONG. REC. H9788, H9793 (2000).
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capacity for attendance by the public and the media.”138 He was particularly
concerned because previous iterations of bankruptcy reform had been in secret:
[I]f we are sending this bill to a conference committee, it should be a real
conference committee, not the sham, shadow conference . . . we had 2
years ago, where after a ceremonial opening . . . everything else was done
in camera . . . . If the spirit of democratic procedure with a small “d,” . . .
is to be upheld, then the conference committee ought to be a real
committee. There ought to be meetings. The meetings ought to be held in
a room with chairs and seats and space for the media . . . as is . . . .
uniformly the case with the rules of the House for committee meetings.139
Representative Nadler concluded that “the meetings of the conference committee
should be in conformance with the normal practices, open meetings, and the bill
should be a result of open deals openly arrived at, to paraphrase Woodrow
Wilson.”140
And how do proponents of the bankruptcy reform debacle justify their secret
approach? Expediency. In regards to the shadow conference, Senator Daschle
remarked that it “seem[ed] to be the most efficient way of resolving this matter.”141
VI. SENATE RULE XXVIII
Senator Wellstone noted that “[c]onference reports are privileged. It is very
difficult for a minority in the Senate to stop a conference report as they can with
other legislation. That is why these conference reports are being used in this way,
and that is why the rules are supposed to restrict their scope.” He noted that such a
procedural move has only been possible since 1996, when the Senate changed Rule
XXVIII which had limited the scope of a conference. Prior to the repeal of Rule
XVIII, the Senate had the power to strike extraneous pieces of legislation inserted by
a conference Committee. At the time of the repeal, Senator Kennedy argued against
the change, “[Conference] reports cannot be amended. So conference committees
are already very powerful. But if conference committees are permitted to add
completely extraneous matters in conference . . . conferees will acquire
unprecedented power. They will acquire the power to legislate in a privileged,
unreviewable fashion on virtually any subject. They will be able to completely
bypass the deliberative process of the Senate.”142
Senator Daschle unsuccessfully attempted to get the prior version of Rule
XXVIII reinstated in 1999. At the time, he stated that Rule XXVIII
is a complete emasculation of the process that the Founding Fathers had
set up . . . . If you were to write a book on how a bill becomes a law, you
would need . . . . a comic book because it is hilarious to look at the lengths
138

146 CONG. REC. H9788, H9791 (2000).

139

146 CONG. REC. H9788, H9791 (2000).

140

Id.

141

Regular Media Briefing With Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle (D-SD), FEDERAL
NEWS SERVICE, April 10, 2000.
142

146 CONG. REC. S11683, S11687 (2000).
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we have gone to thwart and undermine and . . . destroy a process that has
worked so well for 220 years.143
Prior to bankruptcy reform, this change was used only three times for appropriations
bills.144
Senator Wellstone summed up the bankruptcy “sham conference” as “a complete
emasculation of the process that the Founding Fathers had set up.”145 The Senator
added that it was “a complete mockery of the legislative process. We have taken a
State Department embassy bill and gutted it. There is not a word left; there is only a
number. Instead, you had a bankruptcy bill put in, completely unrelated . . . without
the deliberation, without the debate, without the ability to offer an amendment. This
is not the way we legislate. This is the Senate at its very worst.”146 Senator
Wellstone also warned that Congress may be on “the road toward a virtual tricameral
legislature – House, Senate, and conference committee.”147 And while the House and
Senate have the constitutional power to amend legislation passed by the other house,
“measures adopted by the all-powerful conference committee are not amendable.”148
Senator Feinstein concluded that “[t]he bankruptcy Conference Report . . . is a case
study of how not to govern. There was no conference; this report emerged as the
product of negotiations held exclusively between House and Senate Republicans.”149
VII. A LEGISLATURE’S DUTY TO EXPLAIN
Some commentators assert that legislatures have a normative duty to explain to
the public the statutes they enact.150 The duty to explain legislation stems from the
respect Congress owes to the public.151 A legislature that enacts legislation without
explaining its actions “asserts superiority over and lack of accountability to the
citizenry.”152 Such a legislature effectively issues an unexplained mandate to
command its citizens.153 This denies basic human dignity.154 In the words of
Professor Laurence Tribe, “[L]aws, unlike naked commands must be understandable

143

Id. (statement of Senator Wellstone, quoting 145 CONG. REC. S9199-01, S9207 (1999)
(statement of Senator Daschle)).
144

146 CONG. REC. S11683, S11687 (2000).

145

146 CONG. REC. S11683, S11687 (2000).

146

146 CONG. REC. S11683, S11691 (2000).

147

146 CONG. REC. S11683, S11687 (2000).

148

Id.

149

146 CONG. REC. S11683, S11727 (2000).

150

Bell, supra note 7, at 9-10.

151
Id. at 9. Commentators also argue that the First Amendment gives citizens a right to
access information about legislative debate. Id. at 15. See infra note 326, at 71.
152

Bell, supra note 7, at 11.

153

Martha I. Morgan, The Constitutional Right to Know Why, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
297, 348, 353 (1982).
154

Id.
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. . . [A] citizen whose basic liberty is subject to control is always entitled to some
answer.”155 Ultimately, a clandestine legislative process is inconsistent with the
Founders’ notion of a government which “derives all its powers directly or indirectly
from the great body of the people . . . .”156
Commentators also argue that there is a “right to be told why,”157 that “other
people are entitled to be treated as autonomous and free beings rather than as
manipulable things,”158 and that this is “a commitment that has informed . . . . the
entire Western liberal tradition.”159 This includes a right not to be misled by the
legislature. When a legislature does its work in secret, it is difficult for the public to
monitor the legislature’s work.160 If citizens are unaware of the reasons for
legislative enactments, they cannot effectively lobby the legislature. Nor can they
exercise their constitutional right to petition the legislature.161 Citizens subjected to a
legislature that deliberates in secret are also unable to judge the accuracy of
assumptions underlying legislative decisions.162
Professor Martha I. Morgan makes a strong case for a requirement that
legislatures explain the reasons for their laws. She states that “[i]f voters are to make
informed judgments concerning governmental decisions they must know why
decisions have been reached.”163 In short, “[e]ffective self-government is dependent
upon a well informed public.”164 Here, where the public cannot watch the
bankruptcy laws being made profound questions arise about the legitimacy of the
law. Since the legitimacy of a policy rests upon the consent of the governed,
“excessive or questionable efforts by government to manufacture consent of the
governed call the legitimacy of its action into question.”165 In short, “the democratic
character of any particular statute lies in the deliberative process it must undergo
before becoming law. To deny any effectiveness to the process of deliberation is to
deny that law’s democratic nature.”166 A Congress that skips the deliberation,
debate, and reports typically found in legislative history is a Congress that shirks its
155
Bell, supra note 7, at n.52, quoting Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 302 (1975).
156

THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 241 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

157

Bell, supra note 7, at 18, quoting Laurence H. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
503 (2d ed. 1988).
158

Bell, supra note 7, at 19, quoting Mortimer R. Kadish & Sanford H. Kadish,
DISCRETION TO DISOBEY 12-13 (1973).
159

Id.

160

Wendy M. Rogovin, The Politics of Facts: “The Illusion of Certainty,” 46 HASTINGS
L.J. 1723, 1740 (1995).
161

Bell, supra note 7, at 21.

162

Morgan, supra note 153, at 348.

163

Id. at 316.

164

Id. at 349.

165

Burt v. Blumenauer, 699 P.2d 168, 175 (Or. 1985); Bell, supra note 7, at n.61.

166

Slade, supra note 9, at 190.
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constitutional responsibility and dodges its democratic duty. “[D]emocracy in this
republic lies in the details, the extensive process an idea must undergo before it
becomes law - - to the extent a statute is democratic, it is only so because of the
processes necessary to produce it.”167
The Federalist Papers demonstrate that the Framers designed Congress to
“preclude agreement on unprincipled, expedient statutes and allow the enactment of
only well-considered statutes designed to further the public good.”168 The Framers
intended for legislative debate and compromise to act as safeguards of minority
rights.169 Thus, the Framers designed the American legislative process to be a
process of “mediation, compromise, and reconciliation of differing views and
opinions.”170 The Constitution’s bicameralism and presentment requirements were
designed to facilitate reasoned and deliberate decision making.171 Furthermore, the
Senate was especially designed to facilitate reasoned, deliberate legislation.172
Overall, the Framers intended for Congress to “refine and enlarge the public views,
by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom
may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of
justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations.”173
Underlying these considerations was the Founders’ central concern with the problem
of factions.174 Controlling the special-interest powers of factions is a “dominant
theme” of the Federalist Papers.175 As Madison stated in The Federalist, “[A]mong
the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be
more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of
faction.”176
Professor Bernard W. Bell argues that courts should view the enactions of
legislatures and legislative history as the action of an institution.177 But for an action
167

Id. at 190 (footnote omitted).

168

Bell, supra note 7, at 37. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 156, at Nos. 10, 51 (James
Madison).
169

Robin Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal Protection and the Problem with Plebiscites, 79
CORNELL L. REV. 527, 535 n.30 (1994).
170
Id. at n.30, quoting James J. Seeley, The Public Referendum and Minority Group
Legislation: Postscript to Reitman v. Mulkey, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 881, 902 (1970).
171

Bell, supra note 7, at n.130.

172

Id.

173
THE FEDERALIST, No. 10, supra note 156, at 82 (James Madison). Although Madison
recognized the risk that “[m]en of factious tempers . . . may, by intrigue . . . betray the interests
of the people.” Id. Madison even recognized that such a faction could arise with respect to
bankruptcy: “Is a law proposed concerning private debts? It is a question to which the
creditors are parties on one side and the debtors on the other.” Id.
174

Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV 223, 223 (1986); Cass R.
Sunstein, Interest Groups In American Public Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29, 40-44 (1985).
175

Macey, supra note 174, at 243-44.

176

THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 156, at 77 (James Madison).

177

Bell, supra note 7, at 79.
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to be credited to the institution of Congress, it should be made known to all members
of Congress.178 Some commentators even assert that a legislature’s role in
publicizing government activities is more important than its legislative role.179 In the
words of James Madison, “the right of freely examining public characters and
measures, and of communication thereon, is the only effectual guardian of every
other right . . . .”180 Madison’s statement is echoed by the dissent in Capital Cities
Media, Inc. v. Chester, which warned that granting Congress unfettered discretion to
decide for us what we need to know . . . . carries with it the seeds of
destruction of participatory democracy, for it places in the hands of those
chosen for positions of authority the power to withhold from those to
whom they should be accountable the very information upon which
informed voting should be based.181
VIII. “THE PEOPLE HAVE A RIGHT TO KNOW!”182
Many modern commentators including Alexander Meiklejohn,183 David Mitchell
Ivester, Martha I. Morgan, Bernard W. Bell, and Woodrow Wilson have observed
that Americans have a right to know the workings of their government. This right
lies in the “basic principle that self government requires the public to be informed of
the activities of the government.”184 But the origins of the right to know stretch at
178

Id.

179

Id. at n.46, citing WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 198 (2d ed. 1885)
and JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 81-84 (Currin V.
Shields ed., 1958).
180

4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN
1787, at 576 (J. Elliot ed. 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT].
181

Capital Cities Media Inc., v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164, 1186 (3rd Cir. 1986) (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting) . Judge Gibbons also noted that “[o]ne cannot vote to throw the rascal out until
informed of rascality.” Id. at 1186. See infra notes 323, 405-407, 415, 416, 420, 424 for more
discussion of Capital Cities.
182

When newspapers undertook organized activities in the 1950’s to crusade for open
meetings, their rallying cry was “[t]he people have a right to know!” Open Meeting Statutes,
supra note 5, at 1199. Another commentator attributes the origin of the term “right to know”
to Kent Cooper, the Executive Director of the Associated Press in 1945. Eugene Cerruti,
“Dancing in the Courthouse”: The First Amendment Right of Access Opens a New Round, 29
U. RICH. L. REV. 237 n.1 (1995).
183

ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF GOVERNMENT
(1948); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE
PEOPLE 95-96 (1948); David Mitchell Ivester, The Constitutional Right to Know, 4 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 109 n.51 (1977). Meiklejohn’s writings have been “enormously influential” upon
the Supreme Court. Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d at 1183 n.6. (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting) (listing thirteen Supreme Court opinions which referer to Meiklejohn).
184

Michael F. DiMario, Remarks Before the Conference on Government Information
Issues in the 21st Century on the Foundations of Federal Public Access Policy (Sept. 17,
1999), in ADMINISTRATIVE NOTES, NEWSLETTER OF THE FEDERAL DEPOSITORY LIBRARY
PROGRAM Vol. 20, no. 17 (1999).
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least as far back as 1644.185 John Milton, in his Areopagitica, argued against
Parliament’s licensing of the press.186 One of the issues in the English struggle over
a free press was the freedom to publish parliamentary debates.187 During that era,
“the argument was repeatedly made that people need to know and have a right to
know about the affairs of government.”188
Ivester posits that the right to know is an independent constitutional right.189 This
right is implicit in the structure of our system of self governance.190 “The sovereign
people, by virtue of their station as the fundamental source of all governmental
power, have an inherent right to know what their government is doing.”191 Ivester
reasons that “[a]lthough pure democracy and an absolutely free flow of information
are difficult, if not impossible, to achieve, the practical relationship between the two
nevertheless remains unchanged. To the extent that a system shares responsibility
for decisionmaking, information must also be shared.”192 A government which
shares no information with its populace is authoritarian, contrary to the American
tradition of self governance.193 Self governance is impossible if the people have
inadequate knowledge of their government’s actions.194
Ivester convincingly demonstrates that the Founders viewed the right to know as
fundamentally necessary to our structure of self government.195 “[I]f the people are
to function as a rational electorate, they must have adequate knowledge of what the
government is doing.”196 However, critics of the right to know argue that there is no
constitutional right to know since it is not explicitly spelled out by the
Constitution.197 This argument fails for two reasons. First, American jurisprudence

185
DiMario states the origins of the right to know stem as far back as Johann Gutenberg’s
development of movable type in 1455. Id. Movable type also fostered the concept of public
access to government information. Id.
186

Ivester, supra note 183, at 125, citing J. MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH FOR THE
LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINTING, TO THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND (1644), in PRIMER OF
INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 169 (H. Jones ed., 1949).
187

Ivester, supra note 183, at 125.

188

Id.

189

Id. at 109.

190

Id.

191

Id. at n.34, citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 839-41 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Branzburg v. Hayes 408 U.S. 665, 713-15 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (further
citations omitted).
192

Ivester, supra note 183, at 109.

193

Id.

194

Id. at 115.

195

Id. at 116.

196

Id. at 115 (citation omitted.).

197

David M. O’Brien, The First Amendment and the Public’s “Right to Know,” 7
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 579, 581, 588, 607 (1980); Lillian R. BeVier, An Informed Public, an
Informing Press: The Search for a Constitutional Principle, 68 CAL. L. REV. 482, 501 (1980).
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and society recognize many rights that are not specifically enumerated in the
Constitution. The right to privacy and the right to travel are but two examples.198
And of course, the Constitution was enacted with the understanding that it was a
limit on government power, and not an exhaustive list of people’s rights.199
Second, it would be absurd if the Constitution granted Congress the power to
withhold information “needed for a responsible exercise of the franchise.”200 After
all, “[n]othing could be more irrational than to give the people power, and to
withhold from them information without which power may be abused.”201 Under this
view, the First Amendment “is not the guardian of mere ‘talkativeness,’ its aim is to
‘prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens’.”202 Ivester
cautions that there is not enough direct evidence to conclusively show that the
people’s right to know about governmental action was the purpose behind the First
Amendment.203 However, evidence of political thought at the time shows “the
fundamental need for public information about governmental affairs was widely
perceived” in England and America.204 In fact, resentment of legislative secrecy
“played a role in fanning the revolutionary flames that swept the colonies.”205
In short, the inherent constitutional importance of a right to know is demonstrated
by many statements made by the Founders and related persons before, during, and
after the formation of our Constitution and Bill of Rights.

198

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1968) (right to travel); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1964) (right to privacy). See Ivester, supra note 183, at n.51. This raises the
possibility that the Court could - and should - make an explicit recognition of the people’s
right to know the workings (and schemings ) of their Congress. The increase in amount and
speed of media today (C- SPAN, the internet, etc.) suggest that this argument is even more
compelling.
199

Ivester makes this point. Ivester, supra note 183, at n.99 (quoting Hennings,
Constitutional Law: The People’s Right to Know, 45 A.B.A.J. 667, 668 (1959) (“like many
other fundamental rights, it was taken so much for granted that it was deemed unnecessary to
include it.”)). And as Alexander Hamilton wrote in THE FEDERALIST, a bill of rights would
“contain various exceptions to powers not granted; and, on this very account, would afford a
colorable pretext to claim more than were granted . . . . Why, for instance, should it be said
that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which
restrictions may be imposed?” THE FEDERALIST, supra, note 148, at No. 84, at 241
(Alexander Hamilton).
200

Ivester, supra note 183, at 117, quoting Parks, The Open Government Principle:
Applying the Right to Know Under the Constitution, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 7 n.14 (1957).
201

Ivester, supra note 183, at 117 (citations omitted).

202

Id. at 118 (citations omitted).

203

Id. at 124.

204

Id. at 124-25. This is also evidenced by the fact that eighteenth century press in both
the colonies and Great Britain defied government bans on reporting the debates of governing
bodies. Teresa Dale Pupillo, The Changing Weather Forecast: Government in the Sunshine in
the 1990’s - An Analysis of State Sunshine Laws, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1165 n.10 (1993).
205

Watkins, supra note 47, at 271.
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IX. STATEMENTS BY THE FOUNDERS SUPPORTING THE RIGHT TO KNOW
Among the noted figures who have spoken and written on the importance of the
public’s right to know about governmental affairs are Benjamin Franklin, Thomas
Jefferson, John Adams, Patrick Henry, John Marshall, James Wilson, and James
Madison.
Benjamin Franklin wrote in 1722 that “[g]overnment . . . the Trustees of the
People . . . for whose Sake alone all publick Matters are . . . transacted, [must] see
whether they be well or ill transacted; so it is the Interest, and ought to be the
Ambition, of all honest Magistrates, to have their Deeds openly examined, and
publickly scan’d.”206 Franklin also wrote that, if freedom of the press meant “the
Liberty of discussing the Propriety of Public Measures and political opinions, let us
have as much of it as you please . . . .”207
In 1734 Andrew Bradford wrote that freedom of the press means “a Liberty of
detecting the wicked and destructive Measures of certain Politicians; of dragging
Villany out of it’s [sic] obscure lurking Holes, and exposing it in it’s [sic] full
Deformity to Open Day; of attacking Wickedness in high Places . . . .”208
In 1747, when the governor of New York attempted to prevent publication of the
legislature’s complaint over the appropriation of funds, New York’s legislature
unanimously voted that “it is the undoubted Right of the People of this Colony, to
know the Proceedings of their Representatives . . . That any Attempt to prohibit the
printing . . . any of the Proceedings of this House, is a infringement of the Privileges
of this House and of the People they represent . . . .”209 Several state constitutions
and conventions also demonstrate support for the right to know about public
affairs.210 The right to know was also recognized in practice. The first instance of a
legislature’s voting record being officially published in the press occurred with the
publication of the division list of the Massachusetts House of Representatives in
1726.211 By the 1760’s both the Massachusetts and Virginia assemblies had
established public galleries.212

206
Ivester, supra note 183, at 120 (citations omitted) (Franklin used the term “Magistrates”
to mean public civil officers, not solely judges.)
207

Id. at n.82 (citations omitted).

208

Ivester, supra note 183, at n.80, quoting THE AMERICAN WEEKLY MERCURY, Apr. 25,
1734 (further citations omitted).
209

Ivester, supra note 183, at n.80, quoting 2 JOURNAL OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NEW
YORK, 193 (further citations omitted).
210
Ivester, supra note 183, at 129-30. Pennsylvania’s 1776 Constitution stated “The
printing presses shall be free to every person who undertakes to examine the proceedings of
the legislature.” Id. at 130 (citations omitted). In 1788, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
that this clause gives “to every citizen a right of investigating the conduct of those who are
intrusted with the public business” Id. at 130.
211

Eugene F. Miller, From Politics of Trust to Politics of Vigilance, 19 GA. L. REV. 781,
787(1985) (reviewing J.R. POLE, THE GIFT OF GOVERNMENT: POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY FROM
THE ENGLISH RESTORATION TO AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE (1983)); Pole, supra note 203, at
121, 151-2.
212

Miller, supra note 211, at 787; Pole supra note 203, at 130.
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After Shay’s rebellion, Thomas Jefferson wrote,
[T]he way to prevent these [errors] of the people is to give them full
information of their affairs thro’ . . . public papers, and to contrive that
those papers should penetrate the whole mass of the people. The basis of
our governments being the opinion of the people, the very first object
should be to keep that right; and were it left to me to decide whether we
should have a government without newspapers, or newspapers without a
government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter.213
In another letter in 1804, Jefferson observed,
[N]o experiment can be more interesting than that we are now trying, and
which we trust will end in establishing the fact that man may be governed
by reason and truth. Our first object should be to leave open to him all the
avenues to truth. The most effectual hitherto found, is the freedom of the
press. It is therefore, the first shut up by those who fear the investigation
of their actions.214
Correspondence between Chief Justice William Cushing of Massachusetts and
John Adams also evinces a belief in the right to know about government’s workings.
In response to the traditional Blackstonian notion that freedom of the press is solely a
freedom from prior restraints, Cushing warned of the tyrannical consequences “if all
men are restrained by the fear of jails, scourges and loss of ears from examining the
conduct of persons in administration.”215 Cushing added that “it cannot be denied”
that “liberty of the press” must include “a free scanning of the conduct of
administration and shewing the tendency of it.”216
In response Adams wrote “Senators are annually eligible by the people. How are
their characters and conduct to be known to their constituents but by the press? If
the press is to be stopped and the people kept in Ignorance we had much better have
the first magistrate and Senators hereditary.”217
Further support for the right to know is demonstrated by the circumstances
surrounding the Alien and Sedition Acts. The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 were
enacted when the United States was on the verge of war with France, and “ideas and
rumors of French plots and espionage were sweeping the country.”218 Among other
things, the Acts outlawed malicious writings against the government. In response to
the Alien and Sedition Acts, James Madison - the drafter of the First Amendment drafted the Virginia Resolutions of 1798, which were passed by Virginia’s General
213

Ivester, supra note 183, at 120, quoting letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward
Carrington Jan. 16, 1787, in 11 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 49 (Boyd ed., 1955).
214
Ivester, supra note 183, at n.59, quoting THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 576 (A. Koch & W. Peden eds., 1944).
215
Ivester, supra note 183, at n.61, quoting Letters of William Cushing and John Adams,
27 MASS L.Q. 12-16 (Oct. 1942), reprinted in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO
JEFFERSON 147-153 (L. Levy ed., 1966).
216

Id.

217

Id.

218

Ivester, supra note 183, at n.63.
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Assembly. Madison observed the acts ought to “produce universal alarm” because
the acts were “leveled against the right of freely examining public characters and
measures[] . . . which has ever been justly deemed the only effectual guardian of
every other right.”219
John Nicholas of Virginia had warned that if the Alien and Sedition Acts were to
pass, “the people will be deprived of that information on public measures which they
have a right to receive, and which is the life and support of a free government
. . . .”220 Even supporters of the Alien and Sedition Acts acknowledged that “in
Governments like ours, where all political power is derived from the people, and
whose foundations are laid in public opinion it is essential that the people be truly
informed of the proceedings, the motives, and views of their constituted
authorities.”221 In sum, since the 1700’s there has been a “long history of public
opposition to and distrust of a government that operates behind closed doors.”222
To be sure, the Founders acknowledged that not every aspect of government
could be in the open. In regards to legislative secrecy, Madison stated “[T]here was
never any legislative assembly without a discretionary power of concealing
important transactions, the publication of which might be detrimental to the
community.”223 However, proponents of the secrecy surrounding the bankruptcy bill
have failed to explain how an open process for bankruptcy legislation would be
“detrimental to the community.” The only thing that openness is detrimental to here
is the ability of special interests to push legislation through at the community’s
expense.
X. THE JOURNAL CLAUSE
The clandestine congressional conduct in efforts to legislate bankruptcy reform
raises constitutional concerns. Does a secret conference committee violate the
publication requirements of the Constitution’s Journal Clause? The Journal Clause
of the Constitution states:
Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings; and from time to
time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment
require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House

219

Ivester, supra note 183, at 122, citing 4 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 528-29 (J. Elliot ed. 1901). Madison also
stated that “the right of electing the members of the government constitutes more particularly
the essence of a free and responsible government. The value and efficacy of this right depends
on the knowledge of the comparative merits and demerits of the candidates for public trust,
and on the equal freedom, consequently, of examining and discussing these merits and
demerits of the candidates respectively.” ELLIOT, supra note 172, at 575.

ON THE

220

Ivester, supra note 183, at 123, citing 8 ANNALS OF CONG. at 2140 (1798)

221

Ivester, supra note 183, at 124, citing 8 ANNALS OF CONG. at 930-931 (Mr. Rutledge).

222

Pupillo, supra note 204, at n.10.

223

Ivester, supra note 183, at n.93 (citations omitted).
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on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be
entered on the Journal.224
What is the meaning of “excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require
Secrecy[?]”225 Does the Journal Clause grant Congress unfettered discretion as to
what legislation and deliberation “require Secrecy[?]” Unfortunately, the Journal
Clause is relatively obscure, and neither courts nor commentators have written much
about it.226 So a definitive answer to the above questions cannot be found in case
law. However, it is clear that the process of secret conference committees for
bankruptcy reform violated the Founders’ intentions as manifested in the Journal
Clause.
Although on its face the Journal Clause appears to leave the decision as to what
“Parts” of the journal “require Secrecy” wholly up to congressional “Judgment,” it is
clear that the Founders did not intend for Congress to arbitrarily conceal important
aspects of its proceedings from public view. The wording of the Journal Clause must
be viewed in its context. The Journal Clause could have been enacted with different
wording, and it underwent several iterations at the Constitutional Convention before
reaching its final form.227 In an earlier version proposed by James Madison and John
Rutledge the Journal Clause would have read:
Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and shall, from time to
time, publish the same, except such parts of the proceedings of the Senate,
when not acting in its legislative capacity, as may be judged by that house
to require secrecy;228
Had this early version of the Journal Clause been enacted, Congress’s obligation
to publish its legislative proceedings would be beyond dispute. However, nearly
every state at the Convention objected vigorously to the phrase “when not acting in
224

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3. The Journal is also addressed in article I, § 7, clause 2 of
the Constitution, which provides that when the president vetoes a bill, Congress must enter the
president’s objections on the Journal; and that the names of persons voting for and against
override of a veto must be recorded on the Journals. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. See Prevost
v. Morgenthau, 106 F.2d 330, 335 (D.C. Cir. 1939). In addition to the Journal Clause, the
Framers’ desire that the people be informed about their government’s workings is reflected in
Article I, Section 9, clause 7 of the Constitution, which provides that “a regular Statement and
Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to
time.” U.S. Const. art I § 9, cl. 7. See Capital Cities Media Inc., v. Chester, 797 F.2d at 1168
(Gibbons, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution states that the
President “shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union
. . . .” U.S. Const art. II § 3.
225

U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.

226

Louis S. Raveson, Unmasking the Motives of Government Decisionmakers: A Subpoena
for Your Thoughts?, 63 N.C.L.REV. 879 n.85 (1985). The Journal Clause is also referred to as
the publication clause. Id. at n.85.
227

ELLIOT, supra note 180, at 238-399; See also MAX FARRAND, 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 257-60 (Yale University Press 1966) (1911) [hereinafter
“FARRAND”].
228

JEFFREY ST. JOHN, CONSTITUTIONAL JOURNAL 154 (1987); See also ELLIOT, supra note
180, at 238 (emphasis added).
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its legislative capacity.”229 Their objections were based on the concern that the
phrase might grant the Senate the power to act in a capacity outside of its legislative
role.230 Consequently, the phrase “when not acting in its legislative capacity,” was
replaced by the phrase “except such parts thereof in [the Senate’s] Judgment require
secrecy . . . .”231 Despite this change in wording, there was unanimous agreement
that each House must keep a journal of its legislative proceedings and publish it from
time to time.232
Moreover, examination of the constitutional debates surrounding the Journal
Clause makes it clear that the “Judgment” phrase in the Journal Clause was intended
only to allow Congress to keep confidential work related to diplomacy, military
preparations, and war.233 Thus, “the Framers intended to create only a narrow band
of confidentiality to protect against the disclosure of military and diplomatic
secrets.”234 This echoes the Articles of Confederation, which required monthly
publication of the proceedings of the Continental Congress yet contained an
exception for treaties, alliances, and military operations.235

229

ST. JOHN, supra note 228, at 154.

230

FARRAND, supra note 227, at 259; ST. JOHN, supra note 228, at 154.

231

FARRAND, supra note 227, at 257; ST. JOHN, supra note 228, at 154. This substitution
only passed by a “narrow 6 to 4 vote with one State divided.” Id., citing FARRAND, supra note
227, at 260 (Yet Elliot states that the delegates struck the phrase “when it shall be acting in its
legislative capacity[,]” and instead inserted the phrase “except such parts thereof as, in their
judgment, require secrecy.” ELLIOT, supra note 180, at 238. Perhaps Elliot neglected to
include the word “not[.]”) Several other proposals to alter the Clause failed. A proposal
which would have required only the House to keep a Journal, while allowing dissenting
members of the Senate to record dissents, failed. ELLIOT, supra note 180, at 238.
232

ST. JOHN, supra note 228, at 154, citing FARRAND, supra note 227, at 260.

233

ELLIOT, supra note 180, at 72 (“Mr. Steele observed . . . the necessity of publishing
their transactions was an excellent check, and that every principle of prudence and good policy
pointed out the necessity of not publishing transactions as related to military arrangements and
war . . . . Mr. Iredell seconded this, by remarking that ‘in time of war it was absolutely
necessary to conceal the operations of government; otherwise no attack on an enemy could be
premeditated with success, for the enemy could discover our plans soon enough to defeat them
- that it was no less imprudent to divulge our negotiations with foreign powers . . . .’”) Id. at
73. Mr. Perley also cited military considerations as a justification for secrecy, noting that it
would have been imprudent for General Washington to publish his military strategies ahead of
time. Id. at 52.
234

Raveson, supra note 226, at n.85 (emphasis added), citing Kaye, Congressional Papers,
Judicial Subpoenas and the Constitution, 24 UCLA L. REV. 523 (1977); FARRAND, supra note
227, at 270. Although a proposal to amend the clause to specifically make the secrecy
provisions applicable only to “treaties and military operations” failed. ELLIOT, supra note 180,
at 238.
235
ST. JOHN, supra note 228, at 154, citing CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 430-31 (1937). Article IX of the Articles of Confederation stated “The
congress of the united states . . . shall publish the Journal of their proceedings monthly, except
such parts thereof relating to treaties, alliances, or military operations, as in their judgment
require secrecy; and the yeas and nays of the delegates of each state, or any of them, at his or
their request shall be furnished with a transcript of the said Journal, except such parts as are
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In sum, the Founders put the Journal Clause in the Constitution to facilitate the
“restraints of public opinion[.]”236 The Journal Clause is a literal commitment to
grant the people the “opportunity of discovering with facility and clearness the
misconduct of the persons they trust.”237 The Journal Clause is a vital aspect of the
Constitution because it facilitates the “restraints of public opinion[]” upon the
government.238
Nonetheless, delegates were concerned that the revised language in the Journal
Clause granted too much leeway to Congress to work in secret. Mr. Widgery
expressed concern that under the phrase “‘except such parts as may require secrecy,’
Congress might withhold the whole journals under this pretence and thereby the
people be kept in ignorance of their doings.”239 Mr. Gorham reassured Mr. Widgery
that “[t]he printers, no doubt, will be interested to obtain the journals as soon as
possible for publication, and they will be published in a book, by Congress, at the
end of every session.”240 Mr. Gorham noted secrecy was sometimes necessary, and
he provided the example that foreign enemies must not be allowed to learn of the
Union’s treaty negotiations.241 When Mr. Graham asked for an explanation of the
words “from time to time,” Mr. Davie answered that “there could be no doubt of . . .
[Congress] publishing them as often as it would be convenient and proper, and that
they would conceal nothing but what it would be unsafe to publish.”242
In fact, Oliver Ellsworth observed that the Journal Clause was superfluous, since
“[t]he Legislature will not fail to publish their proceedings from time to time - The
<people> will call for it if it should be improperly omitted.” (punctuation in the
original)243 In other words, the Founders presumed that people would have it “within
their power and ability to monitor and check government secrecy even without an
express constitutional provision.”244
Patrick Henry feared the Constitution still would not adequately prevent abuse of
governmental secrecy: “[t]he liberties of a people never were, nor ever will be,
above excepted, to lay before the legislatures of the several states.” O’Brien, supra note 189,
at 591-2, citing 19 THE JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 214 (1912).
236

Laura S. Fitzgerald, Cadenced Power: The Kinetic Constitution, 46 DUKE L.J. 679, 768,
757 (2001).
237
Id. at 768-69, quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 at 477-78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob
E. Cooke ed., 1961). However, other commentators argue that the Journal Clause merely
emphasizes the accountability of individual legislators. Bell, supra note 7, at n.86.
238

THE FEDERALIST No. 70 at 477-78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961),
quoted in Fitzgerald, supra note 236, at 768.
239

ELLIOT, supra note 180, at 52 (emphasis in original).

240

Id.

241

Id.

242

Id. at 72 (emphasis added); See also FARRAND, supra note 227, at 345 (emphasis
added).
243

FARRAND, supra note 227, at 260; Ivester, supra note 183, at 132, citing 5 DEBATES IN
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 408 (J.
Elliot ed., 1901)
THE

244

Ivester, supra note 183, at 132.
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secure, when the transactions of their rulers may be concealed from them . . . .”
Henry understood a legitimate need for secrecy under certain conditions. “[S]uch
transactions as relate to military operations . . . I would not wish to be published, till
the end which required their secrecy should have been effected. But to cover with
the veil of secrecy the common routine of business, is an abomination in the eyes of
every intelligent man, and every friend to his country.”245 Henry criticized the
Journal Clause for failing to specify both the frequency of journal publication, and
the circumstances under which journals could be kept secret.246
Henry also warned that:
The important right of making treaties is upon the most dangerous
foundation. The President, and a few senators, possess it in the most
unlimited manner, without any real responsibility, if from sinister views,
they should think proper to abuse it; for they may keep all their measures
in the most profound secrecy, as long as they please. Were we not told
that war was the case wherein secrecy was the most necessary? But by
the paper on your table, their secrecy is not limited to this case only. It is
as unlimited and unbounded as their powers. Under the abominable veil
of political secrecy and contrivance, your most valuable rights may be
sacrificed by a most corrupt faction, without having the satisfaction of
knowing who injured you. They are bound by honor and conscience to
act with integrity, but they are under no constitutional restraint.247
Henry added “I do not wish that transactions relative to treaties should, when
unfinished, be exposed; but it should be known after they were concluded, who had
advised them to be made, in order to secure some degree of certainty that the public
interest shall be consulted in their formation.”248
John Marshall responded to Henry’s fears by reassuring him that in the
Constitution, “secrecy is only used when it would be fatal and pernicious to publish
the schemes of government.”249 In fact, “in the most explicit language, one of the
most influential members of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 declared before
the Convention that the people have a right to know.”250 James Wilson of
Pennsylvania stated “[T]he people have a right to know what their agents are doing
or have done, and it should not be in the option of the legislature to conceal their
proceedings.”251
245

Id. at 131, quoting 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 170 (J. Elliot ed., 1901)

CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION

246

Ivester, supra note 183, at n.96.

247

ELLIOT, supra note 180, at 315-16.

248

Id. at 316.

249

Ivester, supra note 183, at 131, quoting 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 233 (J. Elliot ed., 1901)
250

Ivester, supra note 183, at 132-33.

251

Ivester, supra note 183, at 132, quoting 5 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 233, 409 (J. Elliot ed., 1901);
ST. JOHN, supra note 228, at 154, citing MAX FARRAND, 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, 260 (1966).
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To be sure, this did not mean the Founders intended for Congress to make an
exhaustive detailing of every proceeding. Mr. J. Galloway indicated that votes did
not need to be recorded for “trifling occasions.”252 However, Galloway noted that
there was “no doubt” that votes would be required “on every occasion of
importance.”253
Additionally, commentators observe that the Journal Clause imposes a
congressional duty to explain.254 In the words of Justice Story,
The object of the whole clause is to insure publicity to the proceedings of
the legislature, and a correspondent responsibility of the members to their
respective constituents. And it is founded in sound policy and deep
political foresight. Intrigue and cabal are thus deprived of some of their
main resources, by plotting and devising measures in secrecy. The public
mind is enlightened by an attentive examination of the public measures;
patriotism and integrity and wisdom obtain their due reward; and votes are
ascertained, not by vague conjecture, but by positive facts . . . . So long as
known and open responsibility is valuable as a check or an incentive
among the representatives of a free people, so long a journal of their
proceedings and their votes, published in the face of the world, will
continue to enjoy public favor and be demanded by public opinion.255
In Marshall Field & Co v. Clark, the appellants contested the validity of a
statute.256 They alleged that an entire section of the enacted statute was not contained
in the form of the bill authenticated by the signatures of the presiding officers of the
respective houses of Congress.257 The pertinent issue was to determine “the nature of
the evidence upon which a court may act when the issue is made as to whether a bill
. . . was or was not passed by Congress.”258 Quoting Justice Story, the Court held
that the purpose of the Journal Clause is to foster publicity, facilitate the public
development of public opinion, act as a check upon intrigue, and prevent the secret
plotting of measures.259
However, the Court held that the Journal Clause does not place specific
requirements upon Congress in terms of the “particular mode” Congress must
employ to record those proceedings not expressly required to be entered on the

252

ELLIOT, supra note 180, at 73.

253

Id.

254

Bell, supra note 7, at n.86, citing Murial Morrisey Spence, The Sleeping Giant:
Textualism as Power Struggle, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 585, 588 n.14, 598 (1994).
255

2 Story, CONST. §§ 840, 841, quoted in Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 670-71 (1892).

256

Clark, 143 U.S. at 669.

257

Id. at 669.

258

Id. at 670.

259

Id. at 670-71.
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Journals.260 Consequently, the level of detail required in the journals is “left to the
discretion of the respective houses of Congress.”261
The Court noted that there are “certain matters [that] the Constitution expressly
requires that they shall be entered on the journal.”262 Yet the Court then stated that
“[t]o what extent the validity of legislative action may be affected by the failure to
have those matters entered on the journal we need not inquire.”263 So the Court
dodged an examination of what the “certain matters” are that the “Constitution
expressly requires . . . shall be entered on the journal.” The ambiguity of Marshall
Field’s holding illustrates that a secret conference committee proceeding would
probably not be actionable as a matter of black letter law. Nonetheless, it is clear
that the “secret plotting of measures” violates the spirit of the Journal Clause. The
Framers would likely be astonished to see Congress covering bankruptcy reform
with Henry’s “veil of secrecy.”
A critic of this article might argue that secret congressional committees are not
fundamentally problematic since the final votes of members of Congress on a bill are
recorded. This is not a new argument. In 1738, when members of the House of
Commons made a last effort to resist the publication of Parliamentary deliberations,
Sir William Wyndham argued to his fellow members that the people “have a right to
know somewhat more of the proceedings of this House than what appears upon your
votes . . . .”264 Wyndham noted that a people’s knowledge beyond just a plain voting
record “is so necessary for their being able to judge of the merits of their
representatives within doors.”265 To be fully informed about their elected officials,
the people must have more knowledge than a plain list of votes. To understand
government institutions and to supervise the proceedings, people must be able to
actually witness those proceedings.266 So too the American people must be able to
observe congressional deliberation.267 Merely permitting the people to see a cold
transcript of what transpired in Congress is not enough.268 As Chief Justice Warren
Burger wrote, “[P]eople in an open society do not demand infallibility from their

260

Clark, 143 U.S. at 671.

261

Id. See U.S. v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 391 n.4 (1990).

262

Clark, 143 U.S. at 671.

263

Id. The Court has not expanded Marshall Field beyond its holding, and has pointed out
that Field does not apply when another provision of the constitution is implicated. MunozFlores, 495 U.S. 385, at n.4.
264
Ivester, supra note 183, at n.73, citing 10 W. COBBETT, PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY 803
(1812) (further citations omitted).
265

Id.

266

Cohn, supra note 3, at 399.

267
Or the press, acting as the agent of the American people. The press acts as an “agent”
for the public, and provides the public with “information needed for the intelligent discharge
of . . . political responsibilities.” Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974);
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555, 584, n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring) (1980).
268

Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at n.22 (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that
availability of a trial transcript is no substitute for public presence at the trial itself).
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institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from
observing.”269
XI. SECRECY IN THE EARLY CONGRESS - AND TODAY
An examination of openness in Congress shows that Patrick Henry’s criticism of
the Journal Clause was unfortunately prophetic. While the House of Representatives
has met in public since its inception,270 the same is not true of the Senate. For the
first few years of its existence, the Senate had an informal “closed-door policy.”271
269

Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572, quoted in Cohn, supra note 3, at 399.

270

Open Meeting Statutes, supra note 5, at 1203; Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press
Access, and the First Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 927 n.46 (1992), citing Frank Thayer,
LEGAL CONTROL OF THE PRESS 33 (1944). But see Watkins, supra note 47, at n.16 (stating the
initial House sessions were attended by reporters in 1789, but that secrecy fell upon the House
by 1792).
271

Cohn, supra note 3, at 370-71. Readers with a knowledge of history will no doubt point
out that secrecy in deliberation occurred prior to the establishment of Congress. During the
Sixteenth and early Seventeenth centuries, the proceedings of the House of Commons were
generally kept secret. Pole, supra note 211, at 89. Only the outcomes of the proceedings, in
the form of laws were officially made known to the public. Id. at 89. The House of Commons
implemented this secrecy policy largely to check the power of the crown. Id. at 90, 95, 141;
Watkins, supra note 47, at 271. Furthermore the House of Commons generally operated under
a fiction of unity, under which the entire House symbolically agreed upon the passage of a bill.
Pole, supra note 211, at 100.
Nonetheless, upon their return home, House members often made reports of Parliamentary
occurrences to their electors. Id. at 97-98, 104. Moreover, the ostensible rule of secrecy was
frequently departed from. Id. at 113-15. By the 1730’s official written accounts of the
occurrences in Parliament sold at rate of two thousand copies a day. Id. at 105. By 1780,
Parliament was almost uniformly open to the public. Id. at 113.
In seventeenth century colonial America, assemblies resisted publishing their proceedings.
Pole, supra note 211, at 119. Like Parliament, colonial assemblies feared interference by the
crown. Id. at 119. But by the 1730’s, division lists were published in the colonial press. Id. at
121, 124, 128. By the time of the Revolution, “the old principle of legislative privacy began
to crumble. It was tainted with the same odor as toryism, aristocracy, and oligarchy.” Id. at
131.
After the Revolution, state constitutions uniformly provided that legislative journals would
be open to the public, and it became customary to admit the public to legislative debates. Id.
at 131. Despite this, the Continental Congress proceeded to meet in secret. Pole, supra note
211, at 132. The Continental Congress implemented its policy of secrecy because it did not
wish to appear divided and also because it had to negotiate with foreign powers. Id. at 132.
Yet this secrecy aroused great suspicion and “destroyed much of the respect” in which the
Continental Congress had been held. Id. at 132.
At the Constitutional Convention, the press was barred from entry and delegates were
enjoined from revealing proceedings to the press. Dyk, supra note 270, at 931; Nixon v.
Admin. of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 n.11 (1977). Yet the secrecy of the Constitutional
Convention must be put into context. The Convention was only years after the Revolution, the
“times that try men’s souls.” THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE, THE AMERICAN CRISIS I (1776),
reprinted in THOMAS PAINE, COLLECTED WRITINGS 91-99 (Eric Foner ed., 1995); see R. B.
Bernstein, Rediscovering Thomas Paine, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 873, 883 (1994). The
Founders feared that “publication of the Convention debates would provide opponents in the
States ammunition to shoot down ratification of the proposed constitution.” ST. JOHN, supra
note 228, at 155, 200.
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This is not to say that all proceedings of the early Senate were secret. The Senate’s
first rules mentioned neither secrecy nor closed doors.272 However, the Senate
adopted resolutions to make proceedings secret.273 Senators viewed themselves as an
aristocracy, as they were not popularly elected.274 The Federalist Party, taking an
elitist view, preferred to conduct proceedings in secret.275 On the other hand, the
populist Republicans desired open sessions.276
The lack of public deliberation by the early Senate led to a great deal of
resentment.277 When the Senate approved the Jay Treaty in executive session in
1794, “the public outcry was deafening.”278 In fact, Senatorial secrecy was the most
Furthermore, not all the Founders were in favor of the secrecy policy. Thomas Jefferson
wrote, “I am sorry that they began their deliberations by so abominable a precedent as that of
tying up the tongues of their members. Nothing can justify this example but the innocence of
their intentions & ignorance of the value of public discussions.” Id. at 19-20, 140. Benjamin
Franklin also disapproved of the secrecy policy (and he required a delegate at his elbow when
in public to remind him of the secrecy requirement). Id. at 19. James Wilson disliked the
secrecy policy, and Luther Martin was “furious” about it. Id. at 20, 130. The press also
complained of the secrecy policy. Id. at 37. Nor was the secrecy policy scrupulously
observed. Leaks occurred to some extent. ST. JOHN, supra note 220, at 118-19, 129, 132.
Secrecy combined with leaks resulted in a public that was often profoundly misinformed as to
the state of the Convention. Id. at 87, 93, 158-59. This included circulation of the rumor that
the delegates planned to make King George’s son an elected monarch. Id. at 132-33.
Moreover, commentators argue that the secrecy of the Constitutional Convention is “quite
irrelevant” because the Journal Clause of the Constitution provides for only limited
congressional secrecy. RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 206
(Harvard U. Press, 1974), quoted in Viet D. Dinh, Book Review, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 346,
349 (1996). In short, during the Constitutional Convention the need for press access to
Congress was asserted, those claims were taken seriously, and the Framers viewed them as a
relevant concern. Dyk, supra note 270, at 933-34.
272

Cohn, supra note 3, at 371.

273

Id.

274

Id.

275

Id. at 370. Members of the Federalist party took the elitist view that Congress was
“supposed to discuss, decide, and speak for people[.]” James P. Martin, When Repression is
Democratic and Constitutional: The Federalist Theory of Representation and the Sedition Act
of 1798, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 117, 132 (1999). According to Martin, the Federalists saw
congressional deliberation to be public “not in the sense of the village commons, open to all,
but of a military base. The people own it but this does not mean individuals can traverse it at
will.” Id. at 138. But even the most elitist of the Federalists would likely be appalled to see
the intense lobbying carried out to push bankruptcy reform. The Federalist party intended for
Congress to be immune from the influence of organized factions, a Congress “set totally above
the influence of a surrounding populace.” Id. at 143 (citation omitted). The Federalist party
did not intend for congressional deliberation to be taken over by “small minorities of active
but unrepresentative citizens.” Id. at 182.
276

Cohn, supra note 3, at 370.

277

Id. at 371; Pole, supra note 211, at 138 (describing early Senate secrecy as “regressive”
in the face of the American people’s established interest in knowing the workings of their
legislature).
278

Cohn, supra note 3, at 373.
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criticized aspect of the Senate in its first five years.279 Critics accused the Senate of
creating plots behind closed doors.280 Philip Freneau, editor of the National Gazette,
launched a campaign to open the Senate’s sessions.281 Freneau observed that
“shutting the doors of the legislature upon the people and excluding private citizens
from their tables [was] dangerous to liberty and entirely inconsistent with the
principle of a free government.”282 Freneau exclaimed “[A]re you freemen who
ought to know the individual conduct of your legislators, or [are] you an inferior
order of beings incapable of comprehending the sublimity of Senatorial functions,
and unworthy to be entrusted with their opinions?”283
This increasing suspicion of Senate secrecy led the Senate to construct a public
gallery in 1795 and to resolve that the galleries be opened every morning, except for
situations which in the Senate’s opinion required secrecy.284 Thus by the mid1790’s, the press actively reported the debates of both houses of Congress.285 In fact,
the right to know had become “a generally recognized view[,]” from which no
legislator would admit dissenting.286 The right to know had become “a new
condition of political legitimacy.”287
Nonetheless, Senators continued to meet in secret sessions and to hold committee
meetings in executive session.288 Senators continued to so meet in part because they
“liked to unbutton their vests, light up cigars and stretch out on the leather couches in
the Senate chamber” while they debated policy.289 For instance, the Bank of the
United States was created behind closed doors.290 The clandestine nature of the
Bank’s creation was criticized.291
In 1929 secrecy in Senate deliberations led to a leak which resulted in a false
newspaper headline.292 Reformers argued that open Senate deliberations would
foster accuracy in press accounts.293 Consequently, the Senate voted in 1929 to
279

Id. at 372.

280

Id.

281

Id. at 371.

282

Id. at n.34, quoting Gerald L. Grotta, Philip Freneau’s Crusade for Open Sessions of
the U.S. Senate, JOURNALISM Q. 670 (Winter 1971).
283

Cohn, supra note 3, at 371, citing Grotta, supra note 282, at 669.

284

Cohn, supra note 3, at 372.

285

Miller, supra note 211, at 785; Pole, supra note 211, at 138-39.

286

Pole, supra note 211, at 140.

287

Id.

288

Cohn, supra note 3, at 373.

289

Id.

290

Id. at n.32.

291

Id.

292

Id. at 375 (referring to inaccurate front page headline from 1929).

293

Id.; see also Open Meeting Statutes, supra note 5, at 1201 (observing that leaks from
closed deliberations are often “incomplete and slanted according to the views of the informant.
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reverse the presumption of Senate secrecy.294 All executive sessions were to be
open, unless the Senate voted specifically to shut the doors.295 From 1929 to 2000,
the Senate held fifty-three executive sessions with closed doors in which it discussed
impeachment, and classified and national defense issues.296 As recently as the early
1960’s, one third of Senate committee meetings were closed.297 However, committee
sessions have been “routinely open to the public” since the mid-1970’s.298
Today, it would seem that it is customary that Congress works in the open. After
all, C-SPAN 2 has provided live “gavel-to-gavel” coverage of every public Senate
session since 1986.299 Nonetheless, some recent incidents of congressional secrecy
have engendered substantial criticism. These recent incidents demonstrate that the
secrecy surrounding the bankruptcy reform process is not an aberrant abuse of
government power. Among recent examples of congressional secrecy are the 2001
tax cut, which was negotiated behind closed doors for two days before Congress’s
Memorial Day recess.300 Negotiations on the 1998 Omnibus Budget Bill were also

To restrict the press to such sources of information is a disservice both to the public, which is
misled, and to the officials, who may be judged on the basis of these distorted reports.”).
294

Cohn, supra note 3, at 376.

295

Id.

296

Id.

297

Open Meeting Statutes, supra note 5, at 1204.

298

Watkins, supra note 47, at 272.

299

Cohn, supra note 3, at 402. Of course, we are aware of the realities of the political
process. “One of the problems with the legislative process today is that its results are often . . .
the result of back-room, under-the-table deals between incumbents and special interests.”
Brannon P. Denning & Brooks R. Smith, Uneasy Riders: The Case for a Truth-in-Legislation
Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 957, 984 (1999). Legislatures commonly act in a deceptive
manner, such as enacting a statute to protect an industry’s special interest, yet presenting the
statue as consumer-protection statute. Bell, supra note 7, at 21 n.64; Macey, supra note 174,
at 232. And it is not unheard of for Congress to pass a statute with a scarce or vague
legislative history. See Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 855-47 (1984); Carlin
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 749 F.2d 113, 116 n.7 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
305 (1988). In fact, legislators are often unaware of the contents of a bill they vote for. See
George Hager, House Passes Spending Bill; Massive Omnibus Measure Larded With Pet
Projects, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 21, 1998, at A01 (discussing House members’ ignorance of
the contents of a massive budget bill weighing forty pounds and quoting Rep. Peter A.
DeFazio’s observation that “half the members couldn’t even lift it, let alone read it.”).
Moreover, “[m]ost political maneuvering, legislative negotiation, and compromise takes
place in circumstances where no official records are kept - at caucuses, leadership meetings
. . . and private conferences.” Bell, supra note 7, at n.273. “Indeed, strategic manipulation of
rules by crafty legislators may ensure the passage of bills that might otherwise fail.” Michael
B. Miller, The Justiciablity of Legislative Rules and the “Political” Political Question
Doctrine, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1341, 1346 (1990). But when, as with bankruptcy reform,
congressional secrecy and manipulation of the rules rise to the level of constitutional import, it
is not just politics as usual.
300

Cohen, supra note 48.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001

37

228

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:191

held behind closed doors.301 Nor is the problem of secrecy facilitating the
questionable insertion of provisions into legislation unique to bankruptcy reform Senator John McCain pointed out that the secrecy on the 1998 budget negotiations
facilitated the insertion of a 52-page long list of wasteful expenditures, including a
$750,000 grant for grasshopper research in Alaska.302 Consider also the $50 billion
tax break for the tobacco industry which was anonymously inserted into revenue
legislation in 1997.303
Of course there is also the recurrent Senatorial practice of placing an anonymous
secret “hold” upon a proposed nominee or action that a Senator disapproves of.
Despite Senate efforts to end this secret practice,304 the practice continues.305
Moreover, there is some indication that in the wake of September 11th terrorist
attacks, security concerns may be improperly used to excuse a reversal of the
decades-long trend towards open government.306
The congressional secrecy which has received the most criticism in recent years
involved the secret Senate debates and closed deliberations during the impeachment
trial of former President Clinton.307 Senators opposed to secrecy in the impeachment
301

John McCain, Editorial, A Budget We Should Be Ashamed Of, THE NEW YORK TIMES,
Oct. 25, 1998, at section 4, 17; Denning & Smith, supra note 299, at 959.
302

McCain, supra note 301; Denning & Smith, supra note 299, at n.18. See id. at 991
(criticizing secrecy with which “pork” appropriations are added to bills); Hager, supra note
291.
303

Senator Russell Feingold, The Supreme Issue: Wisconsin’s Leadership in Government
Reform, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 823, 826 (1998) (mentioning a $50 billion tax break for the
tobacco industry anonymously inserted into revenue legislation in 1997).
304

John Breshnahan, Senate Leaders End Secrecy of ‘Holds’, ROLL CALL, March 8, 1999.

305
Helen Dewar, Senate Has a ‘Hold’ on Holbrooke; Policy Fails to Curtail Secret Delay
Tactic, THE WASHINGTON POST, July 3, 1999, at A05; Leahy’s Office Denies Hold on Walters
Drug Czar Nomination, THE BULLETIN’S FRONTRUNNER, Nov. 21, 2001; Joan Flynn, A Quiet
Revolution at the Labor Board: The Transformation of the NLRB 1935-2000, 61 OHIO ST. L.J.
1361, 1440. When a secret “hold’ is placed, even other senators are often unable to discover
the identity of the senator who placed the “hold.” Patry, supra note 73, at 147-48; Anonymous
Holds Still Slowing Bills in Senate, THE BULLETIN’S FRONTRUNNER, Nov. 16, 2001.
306

See Michael Y. Park, Where the Sunshine Laws Don’t Shine, FOX NEWS, Nov. 29 2001,
at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,39672,00.html (discussing reactions of Professors
Laurence H. Tribe and Samuel Issacharoff to moves towards increased governmental secrecy
in Florida, Iowa, and New Hampshire); Brendan Farrington, Watchdog Groups Criticize
Efforts to Close Meetings, Records, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS STATE & LOCAL WIRE, Oct. 27,
2001 (discussing efforts to change State Senate rules in Florida to allow secret meetings and
even secret votes); Connie Mabin, Coryn: Lawmakers Should Study Open Records Security
Exemption, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS STATE & LOCAL WIRE, Dec. 11, 2001 (Texas Attorney
General recommending the creation of a security exemption to state sunshine laws).
307

Cohn, supra note 3, at 366, 392. Another example of the abuse of governmental
secrecy in policy deliberation (albeit not a congressional abuse) involved the secrecy
surrounding the Clintons’ President’s Task Force on National Health Care Reform. See
Assoc. of Am. Physicians and Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 813 F. Supp. 82, 84, 94 (D.D.C.
1993), rev’d and remanded, 337 U.S. 394 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The Administration kept the
workings of the Task Force secret in an attempt to avoid press criticism. W. John Thomas,
The Clinton Health Care Reform Plan: A Failed Dramatic Presentation, 7 STAN. L. & POL’Y
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process argued that the Senate must not act like a private club, and the public had a
right to see how the Senate reached its decisions.308 Senator Lieberman argued that
Americans should be able to watch the impeachment trial “end on a note of rational
and thoughtful debate.”309 There were both Republican and Democrat Senators who
agreed on the need for public deliberations.310 Senator Arlen Specter stated, “[I]t is
very important for the American people to understand as fully as possible why we
are doing what we are doing.”311
XII. THE SOCIETAL PURPOSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND
ACCESS TO CONGRESSIONAL DELIBERATION
Just so far as, at any point, the citizens who are to decide an issue are
denied acquaintance with information . . . relevant to that issue, just so far
the result must be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for the general
good. It is that mutilation of the thinking process of the community
against which the First Amendment to the Constitution is directed. The
principle of the freedom of speech springs from the necessities of the
program of self government.312
If we view the First Amendment as an American commitment to a framework of
values, then the First Amendment requires open government.313 As Justice Brennan
observed, the First Amendment “has a structural role . . . in securing and fostering
our republican system of self government.”314 In his dissent in Saxbe v. Washington
Post, Justice Powell wrote at length of the First Amendment’s “societal function . . .
in preserving free public discussion of governmental affairs.”315 He observed that
“[n]o aspect of that constitutional guarantee is more rightly treasured than its
protection of the ability of our people through free and open debate to consider and
resolve their own destiny.”316 Justice Powell quoted then-Solicitor General Robert
REV. 83, 88 (1995-96). The Task Force kept the names of its 500-odd members secret; and
held at least 20 secret meetings and only one quasi-public meeting. Id. at 89-90. The secrecy
of the Task Force’s deliberations was subject to widespread criticism. Nancy Benac, White
House to Release Secret Documents of Health Task Force, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 18,
1994. Thus, secrecy was instrumental in the collapse of public support for the plan. Thomas,
supra note 307, at 84.
308

Cohn, supra note 3, at 392, quoting Senator Tom Harkin.

309

Id. at 393.

310

Id. at 394.

311

Id.

312

ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH 26 (1948) (emphasis in original), quoted in
Saxbe v. Wash. Post, 417 U.S. 843, 863 n.8 (Powell, J., dissenting).
313
David A. Anderson, Metaphorical Scholarship, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1205, 1217 (1991),
citing STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE (Harvard
University Press, 1990).
314

Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring).

315

417 U.S. at 862 (Powell, J., dissenting.)

316

Id.
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H. Bork’s observation that “the First Amendment is one of the vital bulwarks of our
national commitment to intelligent self government.”317 Justice Powell added that
the First Amendment
embodies our Nation’s commitment to popular self-determination and our
abiding faith that the surest course for developing sound national policy
lies in a free exchange of views on public issues. And public debate must
not only be unfettered; it must also be informed. For that reason this
Court has repeatedly stated that First Amendment concerns encompass the
receipt of information and ideas as well as the right of free expression.318
Justice Powell further stated that “this reasoning . . . underlies our recognition in
Branzburg that ‘news gathering is not without its First Amendment protections
. . . .’”319 The Justice added that “[b]y enabling the public to assert meaningful
control over the political process, the press performs a crucial function in effecting
the societal purpose of the First Amendment.”320 In other words, “these expressly
guaranteed freedoms “share a ‘common core purpose of assuring freedom of
communication on matters relating to the functioning of government’.”321
It is clear that the Framers intended for the First Amendment to act as a check on
the actions of government officials. In fact, Patrick Henry argued that one of the
main reasons necessitating the adoption of a bill of rights was to prevent the abuse of
governmental secrecy.322 The author of the First Amendment, James Madison,
repeatedly made statements in Congress indicating that he intended for the First
Amendment to restrain the abuse of power by public officials.323 Madison contrasted
Britain’s nearly omnipotent Parliament with Congress:
In the United States, the case is altogether different. The people, not
the government, possess the absolute sovereignty. The legislature, no less
than the executive, is under limitations of power. Encroachments are
regarded as possible from the one as well as from the other. Hence, in the
United States, the great and essential rights of the people are secured
against legislative as well as executive ambition. They are secured, not by
laws paramount to prerogative, but by constitutions paramount to laws.
This security of the freedom of the press requires that it should be exempt,
not only from previous restraint of the executive, as in Great Britain but
from legislative restraint also; and this exemption, to be effectual must be
an exemption, not only from the previous inspection of licensers, but from
317

Id.

318

417 U.S. at 862-63 (Powell, J., dissenting)(citations and footnote omitted).

319

Id. at 863, citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972).

320

417 U.S. at 862 (Powell, J., dissenting).

321

Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 517 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring).

322

ELLIOT, supra note 180, at 314-316; see supra note 243 and text.

323

Capital Cities Media, Inc., 797 F.2d at 1184 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (noting that
Madison articulated this justification for the speech-press clause in the House of
Representatives on June 8, 1789, in a House debate in 1794, and again in 1799) (citations
omitted).
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the subsequent penalty of laws . . . . In the United States, the executive
magistrates are not held to be infallible, nor the legislatures to be
omnipotent; and both, being elective, are both responsible.324
Thomas Jefferson also viewed freedom of the press as putting a “legal check . . . into
the hands of the Judiciary.”325
Similarly, many modern commentators have written on the importance of the
First Amendment in restraining governmental abuses of power.326 They note that by
providing the public with information pertaining to governmental decisions, the press
acts as a check on governmental abuse.327 Professor Vincent Blasi is a noted
proponent of this concept of the First Amendment, which gives each citizen a right to
hear “all matters relevant to governance.”328 While this may not mean that all
citizens are personally involved in forming public policy, it does envision citizens
using their right to vote for officials to veto public policy.329 The “checking” concept
of the First Amendment has been noted by the Court. In Grosjean v. American Press
Co., the Court recognized that the “untrammeled press” is a “vital source” of “public
information” and stated that “informed public opinion is the most potent of all
restraints upon misgovernment. . . .”330 In Mills v. Alabama, the Court stated that
“the press serves and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of
power by governmental officials and as a constitutionally chosen means for keeping
officials elected by the people responsible to all the people whom they were selected
to serve.”331 Moreover, the requirement that a legislator explain her vote facilitates

324
James Madison, quoted in Capital Cities Media, Inc., 797 F.2d at 1184 (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting), citing 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT
PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, 569-70 (J. Elliot ed., 1881).
325
Dyk, supra note 270, at 933, quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison
(Mar. 15, 1789), in 14 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 1788-1789 at 659 (1958).
326

Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 521, 542 (1977); Margaret S. DeWind, The Wisconsin Supreme Court Lets the Sun
Shine In: State v. Showers and the Wisconsin Open Meeting Law, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 827, 832
(1988).
327

Scott A. MacNair, Is There a Right to View the Dead at Dover? JB Pictures v.
Department of Defense: Limits on the Media’s Right to Gather Information, 4 VILL. SPORTS &
ENT. L.J. 387, 388 (1997).
328

Blasi, supra note 326, at 524.

329

DeWind, supra note 326, at 832.

330

Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).

331

Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547,
571-72 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“[p]rotection of those sources is necessary to ensure
that the press can fulfill its constitutionally designated function of informing the public . . . .”).
Justice Potter Stewart also has spoken on the importance of the press as a check upon
government power. Dyk, supra note 270, at 931.
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deliberation by the legislature and “induce[s] votes that transcend narrow
interests.”332
Consequently, this concept of the First Amendment recognizes that governmental
restrictions on speech may allow abuses to go unrecognized.333 So the First
Amendment principle of access serves to facilitate the public’s monitoring of
government officials.334 Open meetings of the legislature are essential “because they
provide the individual with information to make voting choices, which is the major
means by which citizens exert power over their elected officials.”335 In sum,
Madison’s vision of the First Amendment, Meiklejohn’s writings upon the First
Amendment’s integral role in self government, and modern ideas of the value of the
First Amendment’s value are all “directly involved when those in power in
government attempt to withhold information about their activities from the people to
whom the government belongs.”336
Unfortunately, the Framers’ views of the First Amendment have not yet been
fully realized as a matter of black letter law. Nonetheless, over the 20th century,
First Amendment jurisprudence evolved into a strong right of access to judicial
proceedings.337 This First Amendment right of access is not absolute.338 Rather, it is
a qualified right, evaluated on a case-by-case basis.339 A landmark case in the
development of the First Amendment right of access is Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia.340 Richmond Newspapers involved a trial court’s closing of a murder
trial to the public.341 The Supreme Court held that the First Amendment guarantees
the right of the press and the public to attend criminal trials.342 This is because it is a
332
Clayton P. Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Action in Local
Government Law, 86 MICH. L. REV. 930, 943-44 (1988) (citation omitted) (“[t]he requirement
of public voting and public explanation restricts the capacity of legislators to vote . . . their
own dark urges . . . .”)
333

MacNair, supra note 327, at 388.

334

United States v. Beckham, 789 F.2d 401, 420 (6th Cir. 1986) (Contie, J., dissenting).

335
DeWind, supra note 326, at 832. This is not to say that First Amendment is a perfectly
effective restraint upon governmental action. “One of the primary reasons for the public’s
failure to rise up in indignation at the special interest nature of certain pieces of legislation is
simply the cost of discovering what Congress is doing.” Macey, supra note 174, at 256
(citation omitted).
336

Capital Cities Media, Inc., 797 F.2d at 1184 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).

337

Cohn, supra note 3, at 400.

338

Hon. William T. Bodoh & Michelle M. Morgan, Protective Orders in Bankruptcy
Court: The Congressional Mandate of Bankruptcy Code Section 107 and its Constitutional
Implications, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 67, 73 (1996).
339

Id.

340

Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555.

341

Id. at 560.

342

Id. at 575-80. The First Amendment considerations - and the public’s right of access are especially strong when a criminal trial involves the conduct of government officials.
United States v. Myers (In re Application of National Broadcasting Co.), 635 F.2d 945, 952
(2d Cir.1980); United States v. Shannon (In re the Application of CBS, Inc.), 540 F. Supp. 769,
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core purpose of the First Amendment to assure “freedom of communication on
matters relating to the functioning of government.”343 Thus, “[f]ree speech carries
with it some freedom to listen.”344 In his concurring opinion in Richmond
Newspapers, Justice Stevens stated: “the Court unequivocally holds that an arbitrary
interference with access to important information is an abridgment of the freedoms
of speech and of the press protected by the First Amendment . . . . I agree that the
First Amendment protects the public and the press from abridgment of their rights of
access to information about the operation of their government . . . .”345
Richmond Newspapers’ requirement of openness has undergone an
“extraordinary expansion” to require open proceedings in both criminal and civil
court proceedings and documents.346 Subsequent to Richmond, the Supreme Court
found that the qualified First Amendment right of access to criminal trials extends to
transcripts of criminal voir dire proceedings,347 the testimony of minors in cases
involving sexual offenses,348 and pretrial suppression hearings.349 Thus, Richmond
and its progeny stand for the proposition that if a “proceeding has traditionally been
open to the public and public access furthers the democratic process, public access to
the proceeding is protected by the First Amendment.”350
Under Richmond, “[w]hether the qualified First Amendment right of access
extends to a particular proceeding . . . depends . . . on whether access would secure to
the public information relevant to the discussion of governmental activity.”351 The
Court relied upon two considerations to make such a determination.352 The first
consideration is whether access to the proceedings would “contribute to the self
governing function and further the democratic process.”353 This is known as the
771-72 (N.D. Ill. 1982); United States v. Martin, 746 F.2d 964, 969 (3d Cir. 1984); United
States v. Beckham, 789 F.2d at 421 (Contie, J., dissenting).
343

Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 574.

344

Id. Richmond also noted that the right to listen, observe, and learn when peaceably
assembled in public stems from the First Amendment. Id. at 578 (citing Hague v. CIO, 307
U.S. 496, 519 (1939)).
345

Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 582-83.

346

Cerruti, supra note 182, at 263.

347

Press-Enter. Co., 464 U.S. 501.

348

Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).

349

Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39
(1984).
350

Bodoh & Morgan, supra note 338, at 71 (citation omitted).

351

Dan Paul, et al., The Development and Structure of the First Amendment Right of
Access to Government Proceedings and Records, 625 PLI/P at 71, 85 (2000). Whether access
should be granted in a particular case depends on “whether access to a particular government
process is important in terms of that very process.” Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589.
352

Paul, et al., supra note 351, at 85.

353

Id.; see Press-Enter. Co., 464 U.S. at 506-08; Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct., 478 U.S. 1,
8 (1986); Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 606; Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 582-84
(Stevens, J., concurring); 448 U.S. 584-98 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring); Gannett
Co., 443 U.S. at 400 (Powell, J., concurring).
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“access doctrine.” The second consideration is whether the proceeding has
historically been open to the public: whether there has been a presumption of
access.354 This is known as the “history prong.”
Following Richmond, circuit courts held that civil trials must also be open to the
public.355 Unfortunately, courts have not made wide use of Richmond’s doctrine to
mandate public access to branches of government other than the judiciary.356
Nonetheless, the Court has never expressly limited application of the people’s right
to information about the functioning of their government to the judicial branch.357
And this right of access is still developing.358
One perceived difficulty in extending the First Amendment rationale of
Richmond Newspapers is that Richmond held that the government could not
arbitrarily close criminal trials to the public because of the long standing history of
open criminal trials, even prior to the adoption of the First Amendment.359
Historically, Congress has not been as uniformly open to public scrutiny as have
criminal trials. However, the tradition of openness need not extend for centuries to
satisfy the history prong. In Cable News Network, the court found the history
prong’s requirement of an “enduring and vital tradition of public entree” satisfied by
a tradition of televison media coverage of presidential activities extending over
several past administrations.360
Moreover, the history prong’s importance is in dispute.361 Some commentators
argue that the history prong has essentially been abandoned in favor of the access
doctrine.362 In Globe Newspaper Co., the Court stated that the historical pattern of
public access is important merely because “a tradition of accessibility implies a
favorable judgment of experience.” Under this view, one should account for the fact

354

Paul, et al., supra note 351, at 85; Press-Enter. Co., 478 U.S. at 8; Press-Enter. Co.,
464 U.S. at 506-08; Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 605.
355
See Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984); Publicker
Indus., Inc., 733 F.2d 1059, 1071 (3d Cir. 1984); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC,
710 F.2d 1165, 1178-79 (6th Cir. 1983).
356

Cerruti, supra note 182, at 263-69.

357

United States v. Beckham, 789 F.2d 401, 418 (6th Cir. 1986) (Contie, J., dissenting);
Scott A. MacNair, supra note 327, at 399.
358

Paul, et al., supra note 351, at 87.

359

Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 576.

360

Cable News Network v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 518 F. Supp, 1238, 1244 (N.D. Ga.

1981).
361

Paul, et al., supra note 351, at 85.

362

Cerruti, supra note 182, at 308. But see Capital Cities Media, Inc., v. Chester, 797 F.2d
1164, 1174 (3d Cir. 1986) (arguing history prong is integral). Yet even the majority in Capital
Cities admitted that “[o]ne could envision a special case . . . where access to governmental
proceedings might be deemed so significant to a democratic government that the First
Amendment would mandate access even without a showing of a tradition of openness.” 797
F.2d at 1177 (Adams, J., concurring). If Congress - the embodiment of representation in our
democracy - is not that special case, then what is?
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that the Senate decided to open its doors early in its history, and that secrecy in
Congress has been the exception, not the rule.363
An alternative to Richmond’s tests is the balancing test set out in Justice Powell’s
concurring opinion in Branzburg v. Hayes.364 The balancing test weighs the public’s
interest in obtaining information against the government’s interest in restricting
access. Branzburg’s balancing test was the “primary analytical tool” used by the
Court in addressing the media’s right of access to penitentiary institutions.365
Ultimately, commentators observe that Richmond Newspapers and its progeny
demonstrate that the First Amendment encompasses a broad array of rights ensuring
that citizens can participate in our republican self government.366 And several courts
have found that the First Amendment and Richmond Newspapers mandate a right of
access to non-judicial proceedings.367 Unfortunately, there is scarce case law
addressing whether the First Amendment doctrine of Richmond Newspapers extends
to legislative deliberation.368 Only one federal court has explicitly advocated this
view of the First Amendment. In WJW-TV, Inc. v. Cleveland, a city council
prohibited the press and public from attending a scheduled city council meeting.369
The council meeting did not discuss privileged or confidential matters.370
Nonetheless, the city council simply claimed it had a prerogative to forbid the public
and press from attending city council meetings.371 In addressing this issue, the
district court held that the press and public have a qualified First Amendment right of
access to legislative meetings.372 The court reasoned that “Richmond Newspapers is
a case about access not only to criminal trials, but equally to ‘matters relating to the
functioning of government.’”373 The court concluded that the qualified right of
access to legislative proceedings “is an inescapable consequence of first amendment
jurisprudence.”374 The Sixth Circuit vacated WJW-TV, Inc. v. Cleveland as moot

363

See supra notes 270-98 and text.

364

Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 710 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).

365

Scott A. MacNair, supra note 327, at 393.

366

Paul, et al., supra note 351, at 84.

367

Cable News Network, 518 F. Supp. at 1238; Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists v. Sec’y of
Labor, 616 F. Supp. 569 (D. Utah 1985), vacated as moot, 832 F.2d 1180, 1186 (10th Cir.
1987).
368
See Paul, et al., supra note 351, at 336-39. A handful of courts have also examined the
common law access right to government information. Id. at 87.
369

WJW-TV, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 686 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Ohio 1988), vacated on
other grounds by, 870 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1989), re-reported in full, 878 F.2d 906 (6th Cir.
1989).
370

Id. at 178.

371

Id.

372

Id. at 177.

373

WJW-TV, Inc., 686 F. Supp. at 178.

374

Id. at 180.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001

45

236

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:191

because a state court had found that the city council’s closed meetings violated state
law and the city’s municipal charter.375
There are other cases which provide suggestion by analogy for the proposition
that it is unconstitutional for Congress to have unfettered discretion to deliberate in
secret. Cable News Network v. American Broadcasting Companies addressed a
White House policy excluding television media from “limited coverage” events that
the print media was allowed to attend.376 The Cable News Network court held that
the press has a First Amendment right of access to presidential news conferences
held in the White House.377 The court observed that both the press and the public
have a qualified First Amendment right of access to news and information
concerning the operations and activities of government.378 Of course, the right is
qualified by limiting considerations such as confidentiality, security, orderly process,
and spatial limitations.379
Following Cable News Network, the court in Society of Professional Journalists
v. Secretary of Labor extended the access doctrine to open up closed hearings held
by a federal agency.380 These formal fact-finding hearings involved the Mine Safety
and Health Administration’s investigation of a fire in a coal mine which killed 27
miners.381 Despite the fact that the statute governing the hearings did not require that
the Secretary hold the hearings in public, the court held that the hearings must be
open.382 The court based its holding not only on the freedom of the press, but also on
the “penumbra of the first amendment guarantees[.]”383 And it specifically required
that the public be granted access to the hearings despite the scarcity of a tradition of
openness in administrative hearings.384 The court observed that historically both
civil trials and congressional sessions have been open to the public.385 Reasoning by
analogy, the court held that administrative hearings must also be open to the
public.386
The court cited to James Madison’s famous admonition regarding open
government387 and noted that
375
WJW-TV, Inc., 878 F.2d at 909-12, citing State ex rel. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co. v.
Barnes, 527 N.E.2d 807 (Ohio 1988).
376

Cable News Network, 518 F. Supp. at 1240.

377

Id. at 1238.

378

Id. at 1244.

379

Id.

380

Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists, 616 F. Supp. at 573, remanded as moot, 832 F.2d 1180
(10th Cir. 1987).
381

Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists, 616 F. Supp. at 570.

382

Id. at 572; 30 U.S.C. § 813(b) (1994).

383

Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists, 616 F. Supp. at 573.

384

Id. at 575.

385

Id.

386

Id.

387

See supra note 3 and text.
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[o]penness is essential . . . to the proper functioning of democratic
processes. Majoritarian pressures are not felt if the majority of the people
are unaware or misled about information crucial to their decisions. The
cloak of secrecy can be used to hide abuses or disguise mistakes until it is
too late to prevent damage from being done. Openness acts as both a
preventative and a curative of such abuses.388
The court further added,
[I]n our democracy, the people control the government. A shift from the
people controlling the government to the government controlling the
people is a shift from democracy to totalitarianism. Administrative
difficulties such as [the administrative burden of conducting open
meetings] are a small price to pay to entrench the procedural safeguards
that keep our society from creeping even slightly closer to totalitarianism.
Such difficulties pale in the light of the constitutional rights of free speech
and a free press.389
Although the court in Society of Professional Journalists took pains to note that
its holding was limited to the facts before it,390 it is also clear that its reasoning about
open government has wide applications. “A right to open proceedings is necessary
to prevent any governmental body from abusing the power it is given.”391
Sherrill v. Knight dealt with the Secret Service’s denial of a White House press
pass to a reporter. The D.C. Circuit held that because the White House had made
press facilities open to reporters, the First Amendment required that refusal of a
White House press pass be based on a compelling governmental interest.392 The
court noted that the case did not involve a claim that the White house must open its
doors to the press.393 Rather, the White House had already made press facilities open
to all bona fide reporters.394 Given that most congressional conference committees
are open to the press, and that the Conference Committee for bankruptcy reform was
generally closed to the public yet insiders were allowed to attend, it seems that
similar First Amendment concerns are raised as in Sherrill.
On the other hand, one can stitch together quotes from the Supreme Court in such
a way as to imply that there is no First Amendment right of access to legislative
proceedings. Cases decided prior to Richmond Newspapers took a more restrictive
view of the First Amendment.395 Prior to Richmond Newspapers, the Court stated
that “public bodies may confine their meetings to specified subject matter and may

388

Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists, 616 F. Supp. at 577.

389

Id. at 579.

390

Id. at 578.

391

Id. at 576.

392

Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 129-30 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

393

Id. at 129.

394

Id.

395

See Cable News Network, 518 F. Supp. at 1242.
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hold nonpublic sessions to transact business.”396 Furthermore, Justice Holmes wrote
that the “Constitution does not require all public acts to be done in town meeting or
an assembly of the whole.”397 In Branzburg v. Hayes, the Court stated, “[I]t has
generally been held that the First Amendment does not guarantee the press a
constitutional right of special access to information not available to the public
generally.”398 And in Houchins v. KQED, Inc., Chief Justice Burger stated, “[T]his
Court has never intimated a First Amendment guarantee of a right of access to all
sources of information within government control.”399 Yet all the above cases were
decided prior to Richmond Newspapers and they should be viewed as modified by
that case.
Furthermore, the Court’s statements in Houchins v. KQED must be put into
context. In that case a news organization sought to take cameras into a prison - an
environment with dramatically different considerations than Congress. Congress
does not have the same “penological interests” of “confinement” as a prison.400 It
would be absurd to permit congressional lawmaking to be as enclosed as the “special
environment” of a prison.401
In Globe Newspaper Co., decided after Richmond Newspapwers, Justice
O’Connor declared in a concurring opinion that she did not interpret the case “to
carry any implications outside the context of criminal trials.”402 She focused on the
statement that “it would be difficult to single out any aspect of government of higher
concern and importance to the people than the manner in which criminal trials are
conducted.”403 But the deliberations of Congress are at least as important as a
criminal trial. In fact, congressional deliberations are more important, as they often
involve the enactment of a statute that will directly affect virtually every American.
Compare this to a criminal trial which commonly affects only one or several people.
Certainly an overhaul of our bankruptcy system impacts more persons than an
ordinary criminal trial.404
The most outspoken criticism of the people’s right to know is the majority
holding in Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester.405 That case involved a state
environmental agency’s refusal to allow a newspaper to view documents regarding
396
Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167, 183
n.8 (1976).
397

Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915).

398

Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 684.

399

Houchins v. KQED, Inc. 438 U.S. 1, 19 (1978).

400

Id. at 36 n.29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

401

See Entm’t Network Inc. v. Lappin, 134 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1017-18 (S.D. Ind. 2001).

402

Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 611 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).

403

Id. (citing Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575).

404

As Senator Feingold commented upon the congressional effort to change the
bankruptcy code, “[w]e’re about to fundamentally change a legal system . . . I hope we act
wisely.” Shannon D. Murray, Congressional Bankruptcy Panel Convenes, THE DAILY DEAL,
Nov. 14, 2001.
405

Capital Cities Media, 797 F.2d at 1164.
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the state agency’s investigation of water contamination from which over four
hundred persons had become ill.406 The Third Circuit held that the newspaper failed
to state a First Amendment claim for access because it failed to allege a historical
pattern of access to documents at the state environmental agency. Thus the Third
Circuit viewed meeting the history prong of Richmond as a mandatory requirement,
regardless of the other merits of a First Amendment claim of access.407 Not all courts
share this view. In JB Pictures, Inc. v. Department of Defense, the D.C. Circuit
criticized the Capital Cities approach and declined to follow it.408 Instead, the D.C.
Circuit used the balancing test set out in Branzburg.409
The Capital Cities Media, Inc. majority argued that the Founders intended access
to government-held information to “depend upon political decisions made by the
people and their elected representatives.”410 Yet the majority’s holding utterly failed
to address the First Amendment’s role in preventing governmental abuse of power.
This is an omission for which the dissent strongly criticized the majority’s opinion.411
The dissent noted that the state agency made no demonstration of a compelling
interest justifying its secrecy and that the majority consequently “sidestep[ped] its
obligation under conventional first amendment jurisprudence to examine the restraint
and to determine whether it is narrowly tailored to the identified governmental
interest.”412 The dissent further criticized the majority’s opinion as “profoundly antidemocratic.”413 The dissent observed that the majority opinion rejected the
“information role of the speech-press clause in citizen participation in self
government in favor of a model of government in which elected executive or
legislative branch officials are deemed to have been delegated the power to decide
for us what we need to know.”414 Furthermore, “the ultimate prior restraint by
government . . . is ignorance of governmental affairs imposed by nondisclosure.”415
Obviously, “people cannot discuss governmental activities of which they are kept in
ignorance.”416
In sum, there is a certain ambiguity, and indeed conflict, in case law on the right
of access.417 Consequently lower courts vary in their approach to the right of access:
some courts use the two prong analysis from Richmond; other courts use the

406

Id. at 1165.

407

Id. at 1173-76.

408

JB Pictures, Inc. v. Dep’t of Def., 86 F.3d 236, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

409

Id. at 239.

410

797 F.2d at 1167.

411

Id. at 1185 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).

412

Id. at 1190.

413

Id. at 1186.

414

Id.

415

Capital Cities Media, Inc., 797 F.2d at 1186.

416

Id.

417

Cable News Network, 518 F. Supp. at 1242; MacNair, supra note 327, at 399.
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balancing test from Branzburg.418 Despite the lack of complete agreement on the
public’s right of access to governmental proceedings, courts generally hold the
opinion that under Richmond Newspapers, both the public and the press have a
limited right of access to information concerning governmental activity.419
So does the First Amendment right of access encompass the people’s right to
observe the deliberations of Congress? It must! It must because the ability to see the
workings of government underlies the societal purpose of the First Amendment. It is
indisputable that granting the people access to congressional deliberation contributes
to self government and furthers democracy.
If the Supreme Court ever does address the issue of secret congressional
deliberation, it will not blindly defer to Congress’s determination to make its
proceedings secret.420 Rather, it is likely that the Court will weigh the competing
values of the congressional interest in secrecy versus the values of openness and
accountability embodied in the First Amendment and the Journal Clause.421 (This
approach seems appropriate, as Congress may indeed have legitimate reasons for
secrecy on, say, portions of a bill that actually deal with the security of foreign
embassies.)
If the Court recognizes a qualified right of public access to observe congressional
deliberations, it will further the First Amendment’s societal function of “preserving
free public discussion of governmental affairs[.]”422 Consider the converse. If the
American people are forbidden from observing the process of lawmaking - as they
were forbidden from observing key aspects of bankruptcy reform - it renders
impossible the intelligent discussion of public issues.
Richmond Newspapers and its progeny support recognition of a right to observe
congressional lawmaking. Nothing would go further to “assur[e] freedom of
communication on matters relating to the functioning of government.”423 As the
dissent in Capital Cities noted, “Cases from DePasquale through Press-Enterprise
. . . make clear that a governmental restriction on access to information about
governmental matters presents a first amendment question, and that such a
restriction, like any other prior restraint, can be sustained only if it demonstrably
advances significant governmental interests and is narrowly tailored to serve those
interests.”424
Richmond Newspapers’s history prong is no obstacle to recognition of this right.
Insofar as Congress has generally been open to the public, it supports this right. And
given that conference committees have generally been open over the last few
418

MacNair, supra note 327, at 399-400.

419

Cable News Network, 518 F. Supp. at 1242 (Contrary to the view of the Capital Cities
majority, we posit that the initial consideration should be one of access unless there is an
articulated government reason for lack of access).
420

Capital Cities Media, Inc., 797 F.2d at 1185 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).

421

Id., citing New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).

422

Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 862 (Powell, J., dissenting).

423

Press Enterprise Co., 464 U.S. at 518 (Stevens, J., concurring).

424

Capital Cities Media, Inc., 797 F.2d at 1189 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
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decades, it also passes the test of the history prong. Certainly there is no justification
for the creation of a special secrecy exception exempting conference committees
from the general tradition of openness in Congress.
Alternatively, under Branzburg’s balancing test it is clear the public must have a
right to observe congressional deliberation. The public’s interest in legislation as
wide ranging as bankruptcy reform is weighty indeed. And the only interest that
congressional proponents of secrecy in “reforming” bankruptcy have been able to
come up with is expediency.425
A proper view of the First Amendment places the burden on Congress to explain
the compelling governmental interest justifying its denial of public access to
committee meetings.426 Congressional proponents of bankruptcy reform also ought
to explain how a secret Conference Committee which arbitrarily allows certain
lobbyists and insiders to attend is narrowly tailored to serve this purported
compelling interest in secrecy.427
XIII. MODERN STATUTES RECOGNIZING THE RIGHT TO KNOW
Even if the First Amendment does not explicitly require that Congress refrain
from making laws in secret, the trend in First Amendment jurisprudence over time
has been towards openness in governmental deliberation.428 In fact, acts such as the
Government in the Sunshine Act,429 the Federal Advisory Committee Act,430 and the
Freedom of Information Act431 show that “Congress and many state legislatures have
concluded that open deliberation often serves the public interest.”432

425
Admittedly there could be circumstances such as the deliberation of sensitive details
pertaining to national security which would constitute a compelling interest in secrecy. See
generally Louis Henkin, The Right to Know and the Duty to Withhold: The Case of the
Pentagon Papers, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 271, 275 (1971) (discussing responsibility of the
government to withhold sensitive information). But even then it would seem that narrowly
tailored pockets of secrecy to conceal sensitive details would suffice. One would not expect it
to be necessary to conceal the entire proceedings of a conference committee’s work on a
national security bill. Certainly congressional debate about broad aspects of national security
policy ought to be open to the American people.
426

See generally Capital Cities Media, Inc., 797 F.2d at 1191 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).

427

JB Pictures, Inc., 86 F.3d at 239, citing Press-Enterprise Co., 464 U.S. at 510;
Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 581; Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 606-07
(requiring a compelling interest).
428
Cerruti, supra note 182, at 237-38. An early example of this trend is the Act of 1813 (3
Stat. 140). DiMario, supra note 176. In this Act, Congress required copies of the Senate and
House journals be sent to the executive branch, state legislatures, and to universities in each
state. Wendy R. Brown, Federal Initiatives to Promote Access to Electronic Government
Information: The Impact on the Federal Depository Library Program. 91 LAW. LIBR. J. 291,
292 (1999).
429

5 U.S.C. § 552b (2002).

430

5 U.S.C. App. §§ 1-14 (2002).

431

5 U.S.C. § 552.

432

B. H. v. McDonald, 49 F.3d 294, 303 (7th Cir. 1995) (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
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The Government in the Sunshine Act requires that the deliberations of every
government agency be open to the public.433 Government agency meetings may be
closed to the public only if the meetings relate to certain enumerated exceptions, for
issues such as national defense, trade secrets, criminal investigations, and personal
information.434 The Government in the Sunshine Act was enacted to bring the
“whole decision-making process” of the Administrative Branch into public view.435
When Congress enacted the Government in the Sunshine Act, the House declared
that “the policy of the United States [is] that the public is entitled to the fullest
practicable information regarding the decision making processes of the Federal
Government. It is the purpose of this Act to provide the public with such
information while protecting the rights of individuals and the ability of the
Government to carry out its responsibilities.”436 In short, it is the policy of the
Government in Sunshine Act that government should conduct the public’s business
in public.437
The Federal Advisory Committee Act,438 prevents federal agencies from using
secret advisory committees.439 Advisory committees include committees, boards,
and commissions utilized by federal agencies or the President.440 Under the Act,
advance notice of an advisory committee meeting must be given. The meeting must
be open to the public, and the public must be allowed to attend the meeting and to
appear or file statements with the committee.441 Advisory committees are prohibited
from allowing only select members of the public to attend meetings.442 This stands
in sharp contrast to the shadow committee on bankruptcy reform which allowed
industry insiders to attend deliberations yet closed its doors on the public.

433

5 U.S.C.A. § 552b (West 1996).

434

5 U.S.C.A. § 552b (c)(1) (West 1996).

435

S. Rep. No. 354 (1975); Cerruti, supra note 182, at 320.

436

Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C.A. 552 b (West 1996).

437

Wilkinson v. Legal Servs. Corp., 865 F. Supp. 891 (D.D.C. 1994), rev’d 80 F.3d 535
(D.C.C. 1996), on remand 27 F. Supp.2d 32 (D.D.C. 1998).
438

5 U.S.C. App. I (West 1996).

439

5 U.S.C.A. App. I (West 1996); see also James T. O’Reilly, Advisers and Secrets: The
Role of Agency Confidentiality in the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 13 N. KY. L. REV. 27
(1986).
440

5 U.S.C.A. App. I § 3 (West 1996). State and local governmental advisory committees
are not covered by the Act. 5 U.S.C.A. App. I § 4(c) (West 1996), and there is also an
exception for committees utilized by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Reserve
System. 5 U.S.C.A. App. I § 4(b) (West 1996).
441

5 U.S.C.A. App. I § 10 (West 1996).

442

O’Reilly, supra note 439, at 30. But there is an exception to allow consultants to attend
closed meetings. Id.
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The Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) grants the public a right of access to
government agency records.443 When Lyndon B. Johnson signed FOIA into law, he
declared
[T]his legislation springs from one of our most essential principles: A
democracy works best when the people have all the information that the
security of the Nation permits. No one should be able to pull the curtains
of secrecy around decisions which can be revealed without injury to the
public interest.444
FOIA does contain an exception for agency policy documents still under internal
development.445 Nonetheless, under FOIA, an agency is prohibited from allowing
only select members of the public to see documents of proposed agency plans.446
In addition to well-known acts such as FOIA, there are approximately an
additional 400 federal statutes requiring the dissemination of information about a
variety of federal programs.447 Furthermore, there is a great demand by the
American public for this information. For example, more than 20 million documents
are downloaded monthly from the Government Printing Office’s website.448 These
legislative documents “represent a major avenue of communication between the
government and the public.”449
Moreover, each of the fifty states has a sunshine law which grants the public the
right to attend deliberative meetings.450 The authors of Open Meeting Statutes
surveyed newspaper editors and found that “the overwhelming consensus of
newspaper editors” was that open meeting statutes are effective in making it easier
443
Congress enacted FOIA in 1966, and amended it in 1974. In 1996 Congress amended
FOIA to grant a right of access to electronic records.
444

Statement by the President upon Signing the “Freedom of Information Act,” 316 Pub.
Papers 699 (July 4, 1966).
445
FOIA exempts classified defense and foreign relations information, internal agency
rules and practices, information which another law prohibits disclosing, trade secrets, agency
communications protected by legal privilege, information regarding personal privacy, law
enforcement information, information about the supervision of financial institutions, and
geological information. 5 U.S.C. § 552 b.
446

O’Reilly, supra note 439, at n.21, citing North Dakota v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 177 (8th Cir.

1978).
447

DiMario, supra note 184, citing Jane Bortnick Griffith and Harold Relyea,
“Compilation of Statutes Authorizing Dissemination of Government Information to the
Public,” CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (1996). Notable among these numerous open
government statutes is the Presidential Records Act of 1978 44 U.S.C.A. § 2201, which
provides for public availability of virtually all presidential records and papers twelve years
after a president leaves office. The extent of the Presidential Records Act is a matter of
current dispute. See Am. Historical Ass’n v. Nat’l Archives and Records Admin. (D.D.C.
filed Nov. 28 2001).
448

DiMario, supra note 184.

449

Id.

450

Anderson, supra note 312, at n.49 (1991), citing J. Watkins, THE MASS MEDIA AND THE
LAW 214-15 (1990); Watkins, supra note 47.
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for reporters to be admitted to legislative meetings.451 Reporters sometimes even
flourished their state’s open meeting statute to gain admittance to an otherwise
closed meeting.452 Overall, open meetings laws are credited with opening the
meetings of state and local governmental legislatures and organizations, including
deliberative bodies such as school boards, city councils, and university boards of
trustees.453 State open meeting statutes have led to a “ubiquitous policy of openness”
which has “improved the working dynamic of the American political structure.”454
Are the legislative considerations in Congress (other than foreign relations and
national security concerns)455 so singular that Congress could not conduct its
business with an open meeting statute similar to the ones that govern every state?456
451

Open Meeting Statutes, supra note 5, at 1216.

452

Id.

453

Id. at 1199, 1200, 1217. However, there are limits to the effectiveness of open meetings
laws, as “no law will ever do away with sneak executive sessions or informal meetings of
public officials who don’t want to meet in public.” Id. at 1217 n.133.
454

Caveney, supra note 6, at 183.

455

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there are no national security secrets contained
in our nation’s Bankruptcy Code.
456
Admittedly, there are some arguments in support of secret law making by Congress.
Arguably closed meetings may grant legislators more freedom to openly discuss all options,
even unpopular ones, without becoming publicly committed to them. DeWind, supra note
318, at 830; O’Reilly, supra note 439, at 456. “[E]xperience teaches that those who expect
public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances
and for their own interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking process.” Nixon, 418 U.S.
at 705.
Yet most open meetings statutes do not prevent free and open discussion among officials.
Since most open meeting statutes prevent closed meetings of a quorum, legislators are still
free to privately discuss issues on a one-to-one basis. DeWind, supra note 326 at 828.
Moreover, legislators must not be allowed to use this argument for secret deliberation to trump
the public’s right to vote against legislators who express unpopular ideas. Id. at 831. Rather,
“[v]oters are supposed to pressure legislators with the threat of voting against them.” Laura
Schenck, Freedom of Information Statutes: The Unfulfilled Legacy, 48 FED. COMM. L.J. 371,
383 (1996).
Secrecy may also facilitate the accommodation of conflicting interests. Open Meeting
Statutes, supra note 5, at 1201. Yet the notion of secrecy facilitating reconciliation could not
have been a concern during the shadow bankruptcy committee, since only selected insiders
were present. See supra note 40 and text. Furthermore, open legislative meetings foster
public debate of political issues and thus strengthen freedom of speech. DeWind, supra note
326, at 830.
Open meetings may discourage uninformed officials from requesting information out of
fear of appearing ignorant. Open Meeting Statutes, supra note 5, at 1201. And secret
meetings may prevent oratorical grandstanding. Id. Yet if open meetings make legislators
appear uninformed, then those legislators ought to do their homework. And if open
deliberations cause politicians to grandstand, the public can see through it. Cohn, supra note
3, at 406. In short, “[t]he weaknesses of those we elect must be exposed, not used as an
excuse to function in secret.” Id.
Moreover, secrecy makes it incredibly difficult for the public to monitor the legislature’s
work and the assumptions behind it. Rogovin, supra note 160, at 1740. “The public’s ability
to make decisions in a well-informed and rational fashion depends on its understanding of
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Open Meeting Statutes concludes that “[e]nsuring the people access to the greatest
possible amount of information about governmental activities is an unimpeachably
sound concept, and as a basic tenet of democratic government, merits legislative
recognition.”457 Typical of state sunshine laws is New York’s Open Meetings Law
which fosters the policy that in a democracy, citizens must be “fully aware of and
able to observe the performance of public officials and attend and listen to the
deliberations and decisions that go into the making of public policy.”458
In short, the secretive deliberation employed by Congress in bankruptcy reform
would not have been a permissible approach for a federal agency to take in
deliberating policy. Nor would it have been permissible for most state legislatures or
local governments to go about secretly setting public policy in such a manner.
Congressional deliberation - arguably the most important legislative deliberation
must be held to the same standards of openness and accountability as virtually all
other legislative deliberation in America today.459 After all, “without [freedom of
information,] the citizens of a democracy have but changed their kings.”460

facts underlying legislation.” Id. at 1740. Open legislative deliberation enhances: the public’s
respect for legislative process, the ability of the public to engage in informed discussion, the
public’s ability to make informed votes, and the integrity of the legislature’s fact-finding
process (which is especially important for fact-intensive legislation such as bankruptcy
reform.) WJW-TV, Inc., 686 F. Supp at 180, citing League of Women Voters v. Adams, 13
Med. L. Rep. 1433 (Super.Ct. 1986).
In sum, the minor conveniences that secrecy provides to legislators are overridden by the
underlying fact that the people’s participation in decision making has traditionally been
considered the basis of democracy. DeWind, supra note 326, at 827. Open meeting laws
enable the public to learn why and how a legislature makes its decisions. Id. at 828.
Of course, the judiciary also uses secrecy to facilitate decision making. Both individual
judges and judicial panels discuss and write court opinions in confidentiality, until the opinion
is actually published. But courts operate under different considerations than a legislature.
First of all, judges do not set public policy. Second, unlike members of Congress, members of
the Judiciary are subject to strict ethical constructs against partiality and the reception of
lobbying. Efforts by interested parties to influence judges are almost always in full public
view–in the form of argument in open court or in written pleadings. Finally, judges typically
issue reasoned opinions which explain the rationale behind their decisions.
Here Congress is foisting a complex, difficult to understand legal code upon an American
public with virtually no explanation of the origins of myriad special interest provisions which
were heavily lobbied for in secrecy.
457

Open Meeting Statutes, supra note 5, at 1220.

458

N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 100 (McKinney 1988). But New York’s law has had problems
stemming from loopholes allowing secret deliberation. See Timothy P. Whelan, New York’s
Open Meetings Law: Revision of the Political Caucus Exemption and Its Implications for
Local Government, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1483, 1501 (1995).
459
At least one commentator observes that FOIA is one of the most important statutes
which Congress has not seen fit to apply to itself. Harold H. Bruff, That the Laws Shall Bind
Equally on All, 48 ARK. L. REV. 105, 113 (1994).
460
H. Cross, THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO KNOW, xiii (1953), quoted in David A. Barrett,
Facilitating Government Decision Making: Distinguishing Between Meeting and Nonmeetings
under the Federal Sunshine Act, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1195 n.1 (1998).
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XIV. DRAGGING CLANDESTINE LAWMAKING OUT INTO THE SUNLIGHT
How can we expose secret lawmaking to sunlight? There are basically three
options. First, Congress could better police itself. Second, the judiciary could
explicitly recognize the people’s First Amendment right to observe legislative
deliberation. Third, Congress could enact an open meetings statute designed to end
secret congressional deliberation.
Under the first approach, Congress could do a better job of following internal
rules to prevent inappropriate secret deliberation. There are already norms and rules
in place to encourage open deliberation by Congress. By creating an internal
mechanism, Congress avoids the separation of powers concerns that might occur
with an executive agency overseeing congressional deliberation. An internal
mechanism also would avoid the risk of the executive overbearing on congressional
autonomy.461
Unfortunately, bankruptcy reform illustrates that internal congressional norms are
easily violated. Expecting Congress to self-enforce internal norms against secret
deliberation is simply unrealistic. The basic structure of the legislative process is
influenced by standing rules, congressional precedent, and legislative custom.462
Many of these conventions are normally followed but “may be violated when
circumstances warrant.”463 Since Congress enforces its own rules of procedure, the
rules have no effect unless members of Congress bring them into play.464 Each
member of Congress must protect his or her own interests by making the appropriate
procedural order if a pending action will violate the rules.465
In short, “the rules have absolutely no effect unless a member brings them into
play.”466 As it is, the rules of the House have no independent enforcement
mechanism, and they are often waived or ignored.467 Each house of Congress is
constitutionally empowered to “determine the Rules of its Proceedings.”468 And it is
probably the majority view that “[i]t is up to the House and the Senate to enact,
modify or repeal their rules, or decide whether to even abide by them. These rules
have generally not been subjected to judicial review.”469 Thus, “for the most part
Congress determines its rules of procedure free of any external pressures.”470

461

Bruff, supra note 459, at 107.

462

Miller, supra note 299, at 1344.

463

Id., quoting Bach, The Nature of Congressional Rules, 5 J.L. & POL. 725, 735 (1989).

464

Miller, supra note 299, at 1346.

465

Id.

466

Id., citing Bach, supra note 463, at 739-40.

467

146 CONG. REC. H9788, H9792 (Statement of Rep. Nadler).

468

U.S. CONST. art. I, 5, cl. 2. Apparently this provision of the Constitution was adopted
without debate. Cohn, supra note 3 at n.17, citing James Madison, THE DEBATES IN THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, 385, 387-88, 431, 616, 618 (1987).
469

Cohn, supra note 3, at 370.

470

Miller, supra note 299, at 1343.
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Under the second option, the judiciary could better recognize the people’s right to
observe congressional deliberation. There are several ways courts could do this.
Courts could recognize a constitutional principle that Congress subject itself to the
laws it enacts.471 Under this “due process of lawmaking,” a citizen could challenge a
statute on the ground that Congress exempted itself from the statute.472 Courts could
review legislative procedure with an eye to this end.473 While the Court has never
insisted that a legislature articulate its reasons for enacting a statute,474 members of
the Court hold divergent views on this issue.475 Professor Morgan notes that
legislative statements of purpose would encourage careful deliberation and valid
decision making.476
Alternatively, courts should grant full recognition to the principle that citizens
have a First Amendment and due process right to challenge the secret deliberation of
a statute. As Ivester notes, recognizing a “directly enforceable right to know,” would
“do justice to the evident sentiments of the framers[.]”477 This judicial approach
would involve courts extending the rationale of Richmond Newspapers to lift the veil
of secrecy from legislative deliberation. “Free speech carries with it some freedom
to listen.”478 Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Richmond Newspapers points out that
for public debate to be valuable, the debate must be informed.479 Justice Brennan
wrote that “[s]ecrecy is profoundly inimical” to a judicial system that demonstrates
the fairness of the law.480
As shown above, commentators have argued that although Richmond
Newspapers and Globe concern access to courts, the rationale underlying those cases
should extend to a right of access to legislative deliberation.481 As Professor Eugene
Cerruti observes, “The central premise of Richmond Newspapers is that meaningful
self government requires an informed electorate, and that where the representative
government itself maintains control of information essential to such an informed
public discourse, the government may be affirmatively required to provide that
information to the public.”482 In his dissent in Capital Cities, Judge Gibbons argued
471

Bruff, supra note 459, at 115.

472

Id.

473

Morgan, supra note 153, at 345-46.

474

Id. at 346, citing U. S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980).

475

Morgan, supra note 153, at 346, citing Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 243 (1981)
(Powell, J., dissenting).
476

Morgan, supra note 153, at 347.

477

Ivester, supra note 183, at 134.

478

Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 576. For an excellent account of the history
surrounding Richmond Newspapers, see Cerruti, supra note 182, at 242.
479

Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring).

480

Id. at 595

481

Morgan, supra note 153, at 315-16 n.196; R. James Assaf, Mr. Smith Comes Home: The
Constitutional Presumption of Openness in Local Legislative Meetings, 40 CASE. W. RES. L.
REV. 227, 230 (1990).
482

Cerruti, supra note 182, at 239.
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that the rationale of the Richmond Newspapers line of cases is in fact more
applicable to Congress and the executive than it is to the judiciary, as the legislative
and executive branches possess more power - and more capacity to abuse power than does the judiciary.483 Underlying Richmond Newspapers is Alexander
Meiklejohn’s observation that “freedom of speech springs from . . . . the basic
American agreement that public issues shall be decided by universal suffrage.”484
This suffrage must be informed.485 Consequently, government must not withhold
information in such a way as to treat citizens as subjects.486
Admittedly, it may not be likely that the Court will apply these First Amendment
doctrines to Congress any time soon. But this lack of judicial action is all the more
reason for Congress itself to enact an open government statute to shed sunlight on its
proceedings.487
The third and superior approach to curing congressional secrecy is for Congress
to enact legislation which takes an active stance in prohibiting Congress from
deliberating public policy behind closed doors. This could be done by enacting or
amending a statute like FOIA, FACA, or the Sunshine Act to specifically cover
Congress.
Currently, open government acts such as FOIA, FACA, and the Sunshine Act do
not apply to Congress. Congress’ penchant for exempting itself from its own laws
has engendered increasing criticism.488 Many commentators argue that open
government statutes such as FOIA should apply to Congress.489 Such an application
would greatly improve congressional accountability.490 The fact that freedom of
information statutes do not cover Congress has been criticized as a “fatal flaw[.]”491
These commentators take the view that it is “fundamentally inappropriate in a
democratic society” to exempt Congress from open government statutes such as
FOIA.492
One commentator observes that “the typical voter reacts with surprise or
disgust[,]” upon “[d]iscovering that Congress is not subject to its own
483

Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d at 1191 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) .

484

Cerruti, supra note 182, at 287, quoting ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 27 (1965).
485

Cerruti, supra note 182, at 290.

486

Id. at 290-91.

487
Commentators note that the judicial reluctance to establish a clear constitutional right to
attend legislative meetings means that legislatures must pass legal enactments to assure access
to governmental deliberations. Open Meeting Statutes, supra note 5, at 1204.
488
Bruff, supra note 459, at 105; James T. O’Reilly, Applying Federal Open Government
Laws to Congress: An Explorative Analysis and Proposal, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 415, 416
(1993).
489

Schenck, supra note 456, at 372; O’Reilly, supra note 488, at 443; Bruff, supra note
459, at 134.
490

O’Reilly, supra note 488, at 415, 445.
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Schenck, supra note 456, at 372.
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Id. at 374.
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enactments.”493 In fact in 1995 Congress demonstrated that it understood the wisdom
of extending many of its enactments to itself. The congressional Accountability Act
of 1995 applies the core provisions of eleven statutes to cover Congress, including
the Fair Labor Standards Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with
Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination Act, and the Occupational Safety and
Health Act.494 Inconsistent with this notion of congressional accountability, the
Congressional Accountability Act did not extend freedom of information and open
meeting laws to end secret congressional deliberation.
Commentators have advocated different approaches to applying open
government laws to Congress. Congress could create an independent commission
and/or internal rules that mirror FOIA, FACA, and other open government statutes.
In the past, Congress has created internal rules to shadow legislation which applies to
it.495 For instance, the House passed a rule creating an Office of Fair Employment
Practices to enforce the central provisions of employment discrimination statutes
upon the House.496 Of course, without an external enforcement mechanism, this
might not be any more effective that the current system.
Professor James T. O’Reilly undertakes a detailed examination of the possibility
of applying FOIA, FACA, and the Government in the Sunshine Act to Congress.497
O’Reilly advocates applying FOIA to cover Congress. However, he notes that
constitutional obstacles prevent simply amending FOIA by pasting the word
“Congress” to the Act’s list of covered entities.498 Consequently, O’Reilly argues
that a carefully tailored version of FOIA should cover Congress.499
Laura Schenck also makes an insightful argument for the enactment of laws
requiring Congress to meet in the open.500 She asserts that the legislative branch can
voluntarily subject itself to a freedom of information statute enforced by the
executive branch.501 This is consistent with separation of powers principles, as the
Framers anticipated an executive strong enough to “counteract overreaching
legislatures.”502 After all, James Madison argued that the legislative, executive, and
judicial departments should not be kept totally distinct.503 Schenck concludes that
493

O’Reilly, supra note 488, at 416.

494

Bruff, supra note 459, at 157; Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 2 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1302 (West 1997).
495

Bruff, supra note 459, at 109.

496

Id., citing Fair Employment Practices Resolution, H.R. RES. 558, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987) (codified as House Rule 51, H.R. RES. 5, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)).
497

O’Reilly, supra note 488, at 415.

498

Id. at 430.

499

Id. at 454. Other commentators agree that FACA and FOIA would have to be modified
before their application to Congress. Bruff, supra note 459, at 133.
500

Schenck, supra note 456, at 386.

501

Id. at 386-87.

502

Id. at 386, quoting Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential
Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 125 (1994).
503

THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 156, at 307, 300-08 (James Madison).
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“[t]he fact that the executive branch could be ‘intrusively involved’ with the affairs
of the legislature does not present a separation of powers obstacle, as long as the
legislature authorizes the intrusion.”504
One might argue that courts are prevented from mandating open congressional
deliberation by concerns regarding separation of powers. The details of this issue are
largely beyond the scope of this article. However, it bears mentioning that it is
“archaic” to view “the separation of powers as requiring three airtight departments of
government.”505 The Framers did not intend the separate branches of government to
operate with absolute independence.506 This is reflected in The Federalist Papers’
citation to Montesquieu that separation of powers “did not mean that these
departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no controul over the acts of each
other.”507 Instead, the Framers intended for separation of powers to facilitate the
different branches’ “means of keeping each other in their proper places.”508 Secrecy
allows Congress to aggrandize its power at the expense of the Executive and Judicial
branches.509 Therefore, separation of powers considerations weigh in favor of ending
the practice of unfettered congressional secrecy.
In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, the Court rejected the claim that
the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act infringed upon separation
of powers.510 The Court held that the proper inquiry as to whether a statute violates
the doctrine of separation of powers focuses on the extent to which the statute
prevents the branch from “accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.”511
A statute requiring open congressional deliberation on matters of public concern
would not prevent Congress from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned
functions. Rather, such a statute would assist Congress in accomplishing those
functions in a constitutional manner consistent with the First Amendment and the
Framer’s intentions of open government.
Moreover, it is worth noting that courts have not established a privilege of
deliberative secrecy for Congress.512 Congress usually honors judicial subpoenas for
congressional papers, yet simultaneously protests that its compliance is voluntary.513
504

Schenck, supra note 456, at 386-87.

505

Nixon v. Admin. of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977), quoting Nixon, 408 F. Supp.
at 342.
506

Nixon, 433 U.S. at 443. See also U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705-08 (1974).

507

Nixon, 433 U.S. at 443, quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 47, pp. 325-326 (J. Cooke ed.,
1961) (emphasis in original).
508

THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 156, at 320 (James Madison).

509

See infra note 515 and text.

510

Nixon, 433 U.S. at 440.

511

Id. at 443

512

Bruff, supra note 459, at 133.

513

Id. Note also that the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution does not absolutely
prohibit judicial review of congressional conduct. Schenck, supra note 456, at 381. Since
Kilbourn v. Thompson, it has been a settled proposition that the Court has the power to review
legislative conduct. 103 U.S. 168, 199 (1881); Schenck, supra note 456, at 381. The Speech
or Debate Clause was intended to grant legislators the right to represent their constituents and
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In addition, secret congressional deliberation itself has an adverse impact on
separation of powers. Secret meetings grant the Senate the power to “amend, revise,
and reject . . . with abandon.”514 This allows Congress to expand its power at the
expense of the executive branch.515
If Congress passes legislation recognizing the people’s right to observe
legislation, it must be effective legislation. A toothless platitude in favor of open
meetings is inadequate. There must be effective means of enforcement. Lessons can
be learned from state open meetings laws. For deliberations to be truly open, the
public must have advance knowledge of the time and place of the deliberations.516
Otherwise, legislators can create de facto secrecy by meeting at unannounced times
in unknown places.517 Some state open meetings laws require twenty-four hours
notice to the public before holding unscheduled meetings.518 Other laws provide for
emergency meetings only after two hour’s advance notice to the press.519 Most state
open meeting statutes provide for executive sessions to deal with subjects which
rightfully should not be publicized.520 This provides for confidential deliberation, for
example, to screen appointees, negotiate land purchases, and discuss sensitive public
security issues.521 A similar set of exemptions would be appropriate for Congress.
Of course this exemption should allow Congress to keep confidential those issues
pertaining to national security.
State open meeting laws take varying approaches to enforcement. Some provide
for criminal penalties for legislators who secretly deliberate.522 This would be
express their views in Congress without fear of harassing litigation. Id. at 381. Consequently,
the Speech or Debate clause prevents courts from imposing liability upon legislators for what
they have stated during the legislative process. Id. at 382.
The current test is whether under Gravel v. U.S., deliberational secrecy is a core legislative
function. 408 U.S. 606, 609-10; Schenck, supra note 456, at 383. Would the Court consider
secrecy to be a protected legislative act, “an integral part of the deliberative and
communicative processes by which Members participate in committee and House proceedings
with respect to the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation. . . .[?]”
Gravel, 408 U.S. at 609-10; Schenck, supra note 456, at 384.
It is clear from the statements of the Founders that secrecy was not intended to be such an
integral part of congressional deliberation on domestic issues. Furthermore, Gravel found that
for the purposes of Speech or Debate clause immunity, distribution of information to the
public does not constitute “an integral part of the deliberative and communicative process.”
Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616; Schenck, supra note 456, at 384.
514

Cohn, supra note 3 at 373.

515

This is similar to the early Parliament’s use of secrecy to expand its power at the
expense of the crown. See supra note 298.
516

Open Meeting Statutes, supra note 5, at 1207.

517

Id.

518

Id. at 1208.

519

Id.
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Id.
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Open Meeting Statutes, supra note 5, at 1208.

522

Id. at 1211; Pupillo, supra note 204, at 1174.
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problematic because of the sometimes inherent ambiguity as to when an executive
session is legitimate.523 To avoid unwitting violations by members of Congress who
honestly thought an issue worthy of executive session, criminal sanctions would
have to be limited to intentional violations.524 Moreover, given the unpalatability of
prosecuting members of Congress, criminal sanctions might never be invoked.
Other state open meeting laws provide for injunctive relief.525 Evidence of
previous violations of a sunshine statute can serve as a basis for an injunction
enjoining future violations.526 However, the prospective nature of injunctive relief
makes this remedy imperfect.527 Members of Congress might be tempted to quickly
enact secretly deliberated legislation, pass it, and let it stand as a fait accompli.
The superior approach is to set up statutory guidelines providing for the
invalidation of legislation enacted without open deliberation. By enacting such a
statute, Congress could specifically grant the judiciary this power. Many states have
seen the wisdom of this approach and have enacted statutes specifically providing for
the voiding of actions and legislation made in violation of state open meeting laws.528
Numerous courts have utilized this approach.529 Courts have invalidated actions
taken during non-public meetings by legislators even when it was clear that the
secrecy of the proceedings was unintended.530 An objection to the invalidation
approach is that it has heavy costs, as persons who rely upon a statute may later find

523

Id.

524

Open Meeting Statutes, supra note 5, at 1211.

525

Watkins, supra note 47, at 346-47; Pupillo, supra note 204, at 1174-75.
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Watkins, supra note 47, at 347.
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Id.
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See CAL. GOV. CODE § 54950, § 54960.1; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. ART. 6252-17,
§ 3(a) (Supp. 1991); FLORIDA F.S.A. § 286.011; [FN65]; see also Pupillo, supra note 204, at
n.65, n.66, citing COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-6- 402(8) (West Supp.1992); IDAHO CODE § 672347(1) (Supp.1993) (providing that action taken at a meeting which violates the statute is null
and void); ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.310(f) (1989) (providing that action taken contrary to statute
is void); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-431.05(A) (1985); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 10501(d)(4) (1993) (providing that if the statute is willfully violated and another adequate
remedy does not exist, a court may void action taken in violation of act); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 15.270(2) (West 1981). Unfortunately, while many state open meeting laws apply to
local legislative bodies, they do not apply to state legislatures. Pupillo, supra note 204, at
n.27. This is a “fundamental flaw”of many open meeting statutes. Id. Fortunately some
states have changed their open meeting laws to remedy this. Id. at 1178-79.
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Toyah Indep. School Dist. v. Pecos-Barstow Indep. School Dist., 466 S.W.2d 377, 380
(1971) (“[i]t is an anomaly to say that a [closed governmental] meeting, the holding of which
is forbidden by law, is a legal meeting”); Goetschius v. Bd. of Ed., 721 N.Y.S.2d 386, 388
(2001); Quast v. S.R. Knutson, 150 N.W.2d 199, 200 (1967); Bogert v. Allentown Hous.
Auth., 231 A.2d 147 (1967); see also Open Meeting Statutes, supra note 5, at 1212-13, citing
Hamrick v. Town of Albertville, 122 So. 448, 456 (1929); City of Lexington v. Davis, 221
S.W.2d 659 (1949); Blum v. Board of Zoning and App., 149 N.Y.S.2d 5, 9 (1956); Green v.
Beste, 76 N.W.2d 165 (1956); see also Pupillo, supra note 204, at n.25.
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Town of Paradise Valley v. Acker, 411 P.2d 168, 170 (1966); City of Lexington v.
Davis, 221 S.W.2d 659, 661 (1949).
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it invalidated.531 But if this objection were paramount, the Supreme Court would
have its hands tied in all areas of constitutional law. The Court invalidates statutes
that infringe upon other constitutional rights. Why not grant this facet of the First
Amendment the same protection? Invalidation serves as an effective deference to
secret governmental deliberation.532
Critics of the right to know argue that the abstract constitutional ideal of a
people’s right to know does not mandate a concrete, legally enforceable right to
know.533 They assert that the right to know is too open-ended to be enforceable.534
They argue that the ideal of a right to know cannot possibly grant every individual
the right to “compel disclosure of the papers and effects of government officials
whenever they bear on public business.”535 Thus they raise the specter of an
enforceable right to know granting nosy citizens the right to peek inside every
government desk drawer.536
We do not advocate such an unbounded approach. A right to view congressional
deliberation is not an open-ended right. It is a concise right which can be clearly
delineated. The general success of other right to know statutes such FOIA and state
open meetings laws demonstrates that the right to know can be articulated with
clarity.
In sum, we advocate congressional enactment of a statute that explicitly
recognizes the people’s right to view the congressional lawmaking process. This can
be done by amending a statute such as the Federal Advisory Committee Act to cover
Congress, or by creating a new statute modeled upon state open meeting laws. The
precise approach taken does not matter, but it is important that the statute have
adequate enforcement mechanisms. It will also be necessary to elucidate what
situations the statute covers. Obviously the statute should require an open meeting
for discussions among a quorum. But it must also mandate open meetings for
conference committees, which are often small in number. Such a statute will grant
the public more access to the legislative process and further the democratic process.
XV. CONCLUSION
We have seen that recent efforts to alter the bankruptcy system under the cover of
secrecy have received harsh criticism from members of Congress, the press, and
various commentators. We have seen that proponents of bankruptcy reform are so
intent upon enacting legislation favoring special interests that they have taken the
unprecedented step of attempting to enact the legislation under the guise of a
completely unrelated, already-enacted bill. We have seen that the shadowy tactics
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Open Meeting Statutes, supra note 5, at 1213.
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See Revelle v. Marston, 898 P.2d 917, 924 (1995).

533

O’Brien, supra note 197, at 588, 607; BeVier, supra note 188, at 501.
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O’Brien, supra note 197, at 611; BeVier, supra note 188, at 505-10.
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O’Brien, supra note 197, at 597, quoting Levi, Confidentiality and Democratic
Government, 30 REC. N.Y. CITY B.A. 323, 327 (1975).
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O’Brien, supra note 197, at 611, citing Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) (noting
that a citizen’s desire to gather information about the way the country is being run does not
grant him the right to unauthorized entry into the White House).
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involved in mysteriously inserting provisions in the bankruptcy legislation border
upon the tactics of a patrician senate, issuing commands by fiat to a subjected
populace. And we have seen that these tactics of secrecy flout the people’s right to
know, are contrary to the intent of the Framers, are inconsistent with the societal
purpose of the First Amendment, are in contravention of the intent of the Journal
Clause, and contradict the philosophy of modern statutes recognizing the public’s
right to know. These tactics of congressional secrecy are contrary to the process of
open, reasoned, and deliberate decision making that is a cornerstone of American
democracy.
Given that open government and open meeting laws apply to every state, to
government documents, to the meeting of federal advisory committees, and to the
meeting of federal agencies, it is an anomaly for Congress to deliberate in secret.
Even in 1790, the American people were “freemen who ought to know the individual
conduct of [their] legislators,” not an “inferior order of beings incapable of
comprehending the sublimity of Senatorial functions . . . .”537 In this new
millennium, it is time to discard the secretive practices of an aristocratic Senate. Let
the people view the work of their representatives. Bankruptcy reform - and all
legislation of public concern - must be deliberated in full view of the American
people. Congress must do its work openly in the sunlight. This is consistent with
the intent of the Framers, as manifested in the Journal Clause and the First
Amendment.
As Woodrow Wilson stated in a criticizm of secret congressional committee
hearings:
I say that until you drive all those things into the open, you are not
connected with your government; you are not represented; you are not
participants in your government. Such a scheme of government by
private understanding deprives you of representation, deprives the people
of representative institutions. It has got to be put into the heads of
legislators that public business is public business.538
Indeed, public business is public business.
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See supra note 283.

538

Bell, supra note 7, at 14, quoting WOODROW WILSON, THE NEW FREEDOM 85 (William
E. Leuchtenburg ed., 1961) (1913).
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